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THE MUTUAL FUND BOARD: A FAILED
EXPERIMENT IN REGULATORY
OUTSOURCING
Alan R. Palmiter*
There is no there there.1
Mutual fund boards are a curious institution. Mandated by the
Investment Company Act of 1940, they are tasked as “watchdog”
supervisors of the management firms that organize, administer and market
mutual funds.2 The fund board and its “independent” directors approve fund
transactions with the management firm and ensure compliance with the
1940 Act and implementing SEC rules. Fund directors thus function as
outsourced regulators, with their selection and compensation in the hands of
the management firm they supervise.
This essay argues that the outsourcing to mutual fund boards of key
regulatory functions—principally the review and approval of management
contracts—has not lived up to the hopes of the 1940 Act. Fund boards have
been weak and even feckless protectors of fund investors, their deficiencies
exacerbated as mutual funds have grown into the leading investment vehicle
for private retirement savings in the United States.
Gauged by the important metric of management fees—whose
negotiation is delegated to fund boards—the experiment in regulatory
outsourcing has failed. As the mutual fund industry has grown in size and
scope, the fund board has shown itself to be mostly ineffective in
negotiating on behalf of fund investors to realize the value from improved
information technologies and growing economies of scale. Study after study
finds fund expense ratios growing over a period when fund assets have
exploded.
Just as significant as their poor performance in negotiating lower
management fees, fund boards have also failed in their supervision of fund
design and marketing. Fund boards, charged with the approval of fund
mergers and dissolutions, have acquiesced in the strategy of many fund
groups of creating a stable of “above average” funds by merging losers into
winners. Fund groups then heavily market the resulting winners (also an
activity subject to board supervision) by appealing to the “past is prologue”
mentality of many fund investors. Fund boards have failed to respond to the
“cognitive biases” of fund investors, a problem aggravated by the shift of

* Professor of Law, Wake Forest University. My thanks to Jim Fanto and Ahmed Taha for
commenting on an earlier draft, and to Jeff Wolfe and Min He for their research help.
1. GERTRUDE STEIN, EVERYBODY’S AUTOBIOGRAPHY 298–300 (1937) (describing how,
after returning to California from a lecture tour, Stein sought to visit her childhood home in
Oakland, but could not find the house).
2. See Burks v. Lasker, 441 U.S. 471, 484 (1979).
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retirement savings from employer-managed defined-benefit plans to
employee-managed defined-contribution plans.
Why has the fund board failed? The structure of the board has hobbled
its ability to function as originally envisioned. “Independent directors” are
selected and nominated by the management firm, subject to a perfunctory
“rubber stamp” by fund investors. The fund board is composed of parttimers who rely on the fund’s management firm for information, direction
and compensation. Even if they wanted to, the fund directors cannot
realistically threaten to take the fund’s business elsewhere. Negotiation on
behalf of fund investors is understandably an empty ritual.
More deeply, the fund board operates without meaningful oversight.
Each overseer envisioned by the 1940 Act—the SEC, federal courts and
state courts—has deferred to fund directors on the hopeful assumption that
oversight will come from elsewhere. Despite regular and continuing
attempts by the SEC to strengthen board independence, the agency has
failed to create true board independence or to give the board clear guidance.
Federal courts, though called on to oversee the board’s setting of
management fees, have refused to become mired in valuing management
services. State courts accept the bedrock principles of the business
judgment rule, thus presuming that fund directors act on an informed basis
with a rational basis, in good faith, and without a conflicting personal
interest.
Director professionalism, part of a relatively recent “best practices”
movement in the mutual fund industry, offers some promise—but at most
can only be aspirational. It does not correct the structural impediments of
the fund board or create mechanisms that would oversee fund directors.
Although fund directors have become more aware of their functions and
responsibilities, they continue to be diffident, highly-paid actors in the face
of a fund management culture that focuses on building market share, asset
size, and profits. Against these odds, director professionalism has little
chance.
Ultimately, the mutual fund regulatory regime places its faith in the
fund investor market—despite the animating premise of the 1940 Act that
disclosure-based market protection is inadequate. Recent studies make clear
that fund investors continue to be inept consumers, plagued by
informational and cognitive biases. Fund investors are largely ignorant of
fund expenses, the relationship of expenses to fund performance, and the
mixed relevance of past performance to future returns. They respond only
weakly to no-load funds and low fees, and even less to changes in fees and
fund risk. The dysfunctional investor market is fueled by fund marketing
(approved by fund boards) that shapes and reinforces investor biases.
This essay first reviews the creation and development of mutual fund
boards, examining their composition and their intended regulatory role. It
considers the institutions charged with overseeing fund boards (the SEC
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and courts) and the deference they have shown to fund boards. The essay
then presents empirical data on the performance of fund boards drawn
largely from the finance literature, data that uniformly suggest that fund
boards have failed to adequately supervise fund management firms. Finally,
the essay considers various proposed reforms to mutual fund governance
and offers a comparison to foreign mutual funds, whose regulatory systems
operate without fund boards. Imagine!
I. MUTUAL FUND BOARDS—OUTSOURCED SUPERVISOR
The board of directors is a defining feature of the corporate structure
that was adopted by the U.S. mutual fund industry at its inception. The
Investment Company Act of 1940 built on this edifice, giving special
gatekeeper functions to the board and its “independent directors.” Over
time, the SEC has delegated additional responsibilities to the fund board.
Under the resulting board-centric structure, the fund board (in theory)
supervises the activities of the mutual fund management firm.3 The fund
board carries out its supervisory functions with minimal oversight.
A. CORPORATE STRUCTURE: FROM THE BEGINNING
Investment companies in the United States are a relatively recent
phenomenon. The first was organized as a corporation in 1924. U.S.
investors were more comfortable with the corporate form, with its
supervisory board of directors, compared to the British model of investment
trusts that had developed in the late nineteenth century.4 The corporation,
unlike the trust, offered an internal supervisory mechanism to oversee the
discretion of the portfolio manager. In the late 1920s investment companies
flourished.
Besides supplying a supervisory board of directors, the corporate form
offered other advantages. It permitted the investment company to issue
various classes of securities—common and preferred stock, debentures, and
mortgage bonds. This facilitated leverage for equity investors, promising
them above-market returns in a booming market.5

3. Wallace Wen Yeu Wang, Corporate Versus Contractual Mutual Funds: An Evaluation of
Structure and Governance, 69 WASH. L. REV. 927, 956–58 (1994) (evaluating the comparative
merits of the structure and governance of the two dominant forms of mutual funds).
4. The trust permitted investors to buy an interest in a portfolio of securities deposited with a
trust company. The trust company committed itself to rules regarding the kinds of securities to be
purchased, holding periods, and management of the investment portfolio. JOHN KENNETH
GALBRAITH, THE GREAT CRASH 1929, at 47–48 (1988).
5. The 1940 Act prohibits leverage by open-end mutual funds, both for investors and in the
fund’s portfolio. See 15 U.S.C. § 80a-18(f) (2000) (prohibiting open-end funds from issuing senior
(debt) securities to investors); Id. § 80a-18(f), (g) (prohibiting open-end funds from borrowing
money except temporarily, but not in excess of 5% of the total fund assets, or from a bank unless
subject to a 300% asset-coverage condition).
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In addition, corporate law (unlike the more rigid law of trusts)
permitted a wide range of self-dealing transactions—if approved by the
corporation’s disinterested board of directors. The sponsor, typically a
financial services firm that had brought the investment company into
existence, could manage the investment portfolio and receive fees.
Sponsoring investment banks could sell securities to their investment
companies, often securities the banks themselves brought to market.
Sponsoring securities firms could sell brokerage services, while commercial
banks could lend money, to their captive investment companies.
In 1940 when Congress got around to regulating investment companies,
it grafted its regulatory scheme onto the existing corporate structure and
placed its faith in the fund board as a substitute for investor self-reliance.6
Congress noted that disclosure under the Securities Act of 1933 and the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 had not deterred “the continuous abuses in
the organization and operation of investment companies.”7 Generally these
acts provide only for publicity, but “the record is clear that publicity alone
is insufficient to eliminate malpractices in investment companies.”8
Having found supervision by fund boards inadequate in the 1920s,
Congress oddly chose to strengthen the hand of the board. For many abuses
identified by Congress—such as preferential trading by insiders, dilutive
pricing of portfolio shares, exorbitant selling charges, undisclosed and
unapproved changes in investment policies, unauthorized transfers to new
management firms, self-dealing sales of worthless securities, borrowings by
insiders without repayment, and lack of transparency on fund finances—the
solution was greater board supervision.9
Although the 1940 Act does not require the corporate form, the
regulatory regime effectively assumes that mutual funds will be organized
as (or along the lines of) a corporation. There must be a board of directors
(or its equivalent) to oversee fund operations and approve contractual
arrangements with the fund’s service providers.10 There must be
shareholder voting to elect board members and approve fundamental

6. See generally Alfred Jaretzki, Jr., The Investment Company Act of 1940, 26 WASH. U. L.Q.
303 (1941); Walter P. North, A Brief History of Federal Investment Company Legislation, 44
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 677 (1969); Comment, Investment Company Act of 1940, 50 YALE L.J. 440
(1941).
7. INVESTMENT TRUST STUDY, INVESTMENT COMPANY ACT OF 1940 AND INVESTMENT
ADVISERS ACT OF 1940, H.R. REP. NO. 76-2639, at 10 (3d Sess. 1940).
8. Id.
9. Paul F. Roye, Div. of Inv. Mgmt., U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Remarks Before the Am.
Law Inst./Am. Bar Ass’n Inv. Co. Regulation and Compliance Conference, The Exciting World of
Inv. Co. Regulation (June 14, 2001), reprinted in Tamar Frankel & Clifford E. Kirsch,
INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT REGULATION, at 32–33 (3d ed. 2005).
10. Investment Company Act of 1940, in 6-83 SECURITIES LAW TECHNIQUES § 83.01
(Matthew Bender 2006).
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changes.11 These requirements apply whether the fund is structured as a
corporation or another form such as a business trust.
Outsourcing to the fund board of a supervisory/regulatory function was
consistent with the general approach of the securities laws. The Securities
Act of 1933 delegated supervision of public securities offerings to nongovernmental watchdogs—namely, the directors and officers of the issuer,
the underwriter and the financial auditor. The Securities Exchange Act of
1934 delegated supervision of trading in public markets to self-regulated
stock exchanges and the National Association of Securities Dealers. In each
case, the SEC and the courts retained a significant oversight role.
Oversight of the fund board, however, is lacking in the 1940 Act. There
was—and still is—no self-regulatory oversight body. The SEC is not tasked
with reviewing the fund board’s ongoing approval of the fund’s
management contracts and marketing arrangements. The courts, though
later assigned a role to oversee management fees, have shunned the
responsibility. For both the SEC and the courts, more daunting than the
volume of fund transactions has been the problem of valuation of
management services. The federal securities regime assiduously avoids
delegating questions of value to the SEC or the courts, instead leaving them
to markets. In the case of mutual funds, given the doubts about the
efficiency of the investor market, the question of value was left to private
negotiations between the fund board and the management firm. It was a
desperate (and overly hopeful) delegation.
B. FUND BOARDS: COMPOSITION AND SELECTION
The 1940 Act regulates the composition and election of fund directors.
A centerpiece of the 1940 Act is the requirement that at least 40 percent of
the board be independent of the management firm.12 Beyond the statutory
requirement, current SEC rules condition the use of the more important
exemptions on a board composed of a majority of independent directors—
creating a de facto regulatory minimum.13 A proposed rule, still in limbo,
would increase the proportion to 75 percent and require an independent
board chair.14
11. Mutual funds must adopt fundamental policies as to key investment activities—capital
structure, permissible investments, investment strategies, risk-reward profile of securities issued
by the fund—which can then be changed only by shareholder vote. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-8(b),
80a-13(a) (2000).
12. Id. § 80a-10(a) (providing that at least 40% of board of directors of registered investment
company must consist of individuals who are not “interested persons”).
13. Role of Independent Directors of Investment Companies, Investment Company Act
Release No. 24,816, 66 Fed. Reg. 3734 (Jan. 2, 2001).
14. See Investment Company Governance, Investment Company Act Release No. 26,520, 69
Fed. Reg. 46,378, 46,381 (July 27, 2004). In June 2005, the D.C. Circuit found that the SEC had
acted within its authority in adopting the governance rules, but had violated the Administrative
Procedures Act by not adequately considering (1) the costs of complying with the governance
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The 1940 Act dictates that shareholders elect fund directors, but only
for the initial board and to fill vacancies if less than a majority of the board
is shareholder-elected.15 Thus, funds operate without annual board
elections.16 Independent directors must be nominated by a majority of
independent directors and elected by shareholders, though vacancies can be
filled by the board in the case of the death, disqualification, or bona fide
resignation of an independent director where there remain sufficient
shareholder-elected directors.17
These rules have not, however, created an independent institution of
fund supervisors. The definition of “interested person” makes it relatively
easy to seat outside directors sympathetic to management firm interests.18
Independent directors are typically securities industry executives and
professionals whose firms provide direct or indirect services to mutual
funds. There are no qualification standards for fund directors.19
Compensation for service on mutual fund boards, particularly for larger
mutual fund families, is typically much higher than for service on boards of

rules and (2) disclosure requirements as an alternative. Chamber of Commerce v. SEC, 412 F.3d
133, 136 (D.C. Cir. 2005). After compiling a more developed record of the costs of the new rule,
the SEC re-adopted it. See Commission Response to Remand by Court of Appeals, Investment
Company Act Release No. 26,985, 70 Fed. Reg. 39,390 (June 30, 2005). In April 2006, the D.C.
Circuit vacated the rule on the ground that the Commission had not adequately considered its cost,
but withheld the issuance of the mandate for ninety days to afford the Commission an opportunity
to reopen the record for comment. Chamber of Commerce v. SEC, 443 F.3d 890, 909 (D.C. Cir.
2006).
15. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-16(a) (2000) (permitting board vacancies to be filled by the board so long
as at least two-thirds of the board remains shareholder-elected). The SEC has taken the position
that, beyond the election of the initial board and the filling of vacancies when required by the
statute, the requirement of annual meetings is generally a matter of state law. JOHN NUVEEN &
CO. INC., SEC No-Action Letter [1986-1987 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 78,383
(Nov. 18, 1986).
16. The fund must be organized in a state that does not require an annual shareholders
meeting—a dispensation offered by states looking to attract mutual fund incorporation. DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 3806 (2006) (generally permitting voting practices that comply with federal
rules); MD. CODE ANN., CORPS & ASS’NS § 2-501(b)(1) (2006) (same).
17. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-16(b).
18. For example, executives of brokerage firms are considered “not interested,” so long as
their firm has not executed trades for the mutual fund group in the previous six months. See
U.S.C.A. § 80a-2(a)(19)(A)(v), (B)(v) (West 2006). The same six-month waiting period applies to
executives of banks and other lenders to the mutual fund group. See id. § 80a-2(a)(19)(A)(vi),
(B)(vi). In addition, former officials or business associates of the management firm are considered
independent after a two-year waiting period. See id. § 80a-2(a)(19)(A)(vii), (B)(vii) (permitting
SEC by order to determine that executives who had a “material business or professional
relationship” with the mutual fund group lack independence, but only if the relationship arose in
the prior two years). See generally Larry D. Barnett, When is a Mutual Fund Director
Independent? The Unexplored Role of Professional Relationships under Section 2(a)(19) of the
Investment Company Act, 4 DEPAUL BUS. & COMM. L.J. 155 (2006).
19. Chris Tobe, Mutual Fund Directors: Governance Changes Proposed for Independent
Directors in the U.S., 8 CORP. GOVERNANCE 25, 28 (2000) (pointing out that fund experience is
not a prerequisite to board service).
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operating companies.20 Moreover, the rules on director tenure discourage
new blood on the board.21 Thus, most fund boards are composed of
industry-friendly, highly paid, long-serving directors. The lack of
independence of mutual fund directors, even those who carry the label “not
interested,” has long been an open secret.22
When the election of directors does occur, the process is “largely
ritualistic.”23 The management firm selects the initial board, and new
directors (including independent directors) are vetted by the management
firm.24 In the 60 years of mutual fund regulation in the United States, no
director nominees have ever been presented to oppose the management
slate. Fund shareholders have little choice (if they bother to vote) but to
rubber stamp nominees proffered by the management firm.25 There is no
incentive to undertake the expense of a proxy fight. Any fund shareholder
dissatisfied with the management firm’s directors would have sold long
before.
C. FUND BOARD: SUPERVISORY FUNCTIONS
The fund board has two essential functions: (1) negotiating and
approving the contract with the management firm (thus setting the terms
and price of the asset management and marketing services provided fund
investors) and (2) supervising the compliance of the management firm and
other service providers with the legal requirements of the 1940 Act
regulatory scheme.26

20. For example, the compensation of the seven independent directors of T. Rowe Price was
increased for 2005 from $150,000 per year to $190,000 per year (the independent chair from
$215,000 to $290,000). See T. Rowe Price Family of Funds 17 (Feb. 28, 2006), available at
http://sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/75170/000087183906000015/finalproxy06.htm.
21. Since shareholders must elect new directors only when the number of shareholder-elected
directors falls below two-thirds of the board, there is a premium on long-serving incumbents and a
penalty against installing new directors. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
22. Robert H. Mundheim & William J. Nutt, The Independent Directors of Mutual Funds,
WHARTON Q., Spring 1972, at 8, 8.
23. Richard M. Phillips, Deregulation under the Investment Company Act—A Reevaluation of
the Corporate Paraphernalia of Shareholder Voting and Boards of Directors, 37 BUS. LAW. 903,
908 (1981).
24. William J. Nutt, A Study of Mutual Fund Independent Directors, 120 U. PA. L. REV. 179,
215–16 (1971).
25. As the SEC has noted, passivity of fund shareholders is the norm. Mutual funds often find
it difficult to obtain a quorum for shareholder meeting, and the voting outcome is almost always
consistent with the wishes of the management firm. DIV. OF INV. MGMT., SEC, PROTECTING
INVESTORS: A HALF CENTURY OF INVESTMENT COMPANY REGULATION 272 n.82 (1992)
[hereinafter SEC Staff Report Protecting Investors].
26. James H. Cheek, III, Report of the American Bar Association Task Force on Corporate
Responsibility, 59 BUS. LAW. 145, 150–54 (2003) (identifying board responsibilities with respect
to investment advisory arrangements, distributions arrangements, and other statutory and
regulatory responsibilities).
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In each area, independent directors have a critical monitoring role. As
explained in a recent report by the SEC staff on the virtues of an
independent board:
[R]eliance is placed on the independent directors, rather than the
Commission, to oversee any conflicts of interest in the transactions
permitted by the rules and to protect the interests of fund investors.27

Ultimately, the fund board insulates the management firm from direct
regulatory oversight.28 The fund board relieves the SEC (or another
oversight body) from responsibility for supervising the management firm
and reviewing its fee arrangements with the fund. The board legitimates the
management firm as a profit-seeking business.
1. Contract Negotiation and Approval
The 1940 Act requires that the fund board annually approve the
investment advisory and underwriting agreements between the fund and the
management firm.29 This board is responsible for negotiating and setting the
advisory fees and responsibilities of the management firm, the
arrangements for buying and selling portfolio investments, and the fund’s
marketing approach.
The regulatory scheme places the fee-setting responsibility on the
board—rather than fund investors, the SEC or the courts. Given the
“ponderous task” of evaluating fees and other costs, the regulatory scheme
assumes that fund investors are incapable of valuing fund management
services and the task would overwhelm the SEC.30 Over time, fund fees

27. See U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Exemptive Rule Amendments of 2004: The Independent
Chair Condition, A Report in Accordance with the consolidated Appropriations Act 16
(Unpublished Working Paper, April 2005), available at http://sec.gov/news/studies/indchair.pdf
[hereinafter SEC Staff Report on Independent Chair]. This reliance on independent directors
reflects the policy decision in the 1940 Act to subject conflicts transactions in the mutual fund not
to “fairness” review by an external decision-maker, such as the SEC or the courts, but rather to
oversight by the relatively untested institution of outside directors. Id. at 9–11.
28. The fund board also insulates the management firm from investor litigation. Under state
corporate law, shareholder derivative suits can be commenced only after the shareholder makes a
demand for board action or pleads the futility of demand. Thus, the board serves as a gatekeeper
for investor litigation. If an investor challenges illegal conduct by the management firm, the board
(or a committee of independent directors) can conduct an investigation and make a business
judgment as to the merits of the claim. See Donald C. Langevoort, Private Litigation to Enforce
Fiduciary Duties in Mutual Funds: Derivative Suits, Disinterested Directors and the Ideology of
Investor Sovereignty, 83 WASH. U. L.Q. 1017, 1026–28 (2005).
29. See 15 U.S.C. § 80a-15(a)(2), (b)(1) (2000) (requiring annual approval of multi-year
agreements by either the board of directors or majority vote of the shareholders). The investment
advisory agreement must also be approved initially by a majority of voting shares. See id.
§ 80a-15(a).
30. See Wang, supra note 3, at 988.
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have become increasingly complex, with different kinds of sales charges
(front-end, contingent deferred, and 12b-1 fees) and expense ratios.31
Fee setting by the fund board involves a negotiation ritual that begins
with the management firm proposing fees that the board (sometimes)
suggests be lowered. The management firm then accepts whatever
marginally lower fees it concludes the market can bear. Take the recent fee
negotiation at AIM, a large mutual fund group targeted in the markettrading scandals that came to light in 2003. To resolve charges that the fund
group had allowed favored clients to skim profits from long-term investors
through rapid trading in and out of funds, AIM (and its affiliated Invesco
group) agreed to reduce fees charged to investors by $75 million over 5
years.32 In 2005, management proposed a fee reduction of $17 million.
When independent directors demanded further cuts of $3 million,
management “winced” and agreed.33 These amounts, however, pale in
comparison to the $742 million in annual revenues for the fund group on
$64 billion in assets under management.34
The fund board’s cabined role is not for lack of formal authority.
Delegation to the management firm does not strip the board of its authority
under state law to “manage and direct” the business and affairs of the
fund.35 Nonetheless, the board is ill equipped and ill situated to do more. It
has no independent staff to advise it on matters of investment policy, fund
operations, or fund design. It has no realistic option (or threat) to hire a new
investment adviser or management firm. And the regulatory structure of the
1940 Act prevents the board from undertaking radical reforms like changing
the fee structure from asset-based fees to performance-based fees.36

31. There are two primary visible fees: sales charges and expense ratios. Sales charges are paid
by the investor when shares are purchased (front-end load) or when shares are redeemed
(contingent deferred sales load). Beyond the load, funds can charge for marketing and advertising
expenses through “12b-1” distribution fees. See Payment of Asset-Based Sales Loads by
Registered Open-End Management Investment Companies, Investment Company Act Release No.
16,431, 41 SEC Docket 207 (June 13, 1988) (describing legislative and administrative history
leading to adoption of Rule 12b-1).
The expense ratio covers the operational services provided by the management firm—
namely, investment management, administration (record-keeping and transaction services to fund
investors), and operating expenses (custodial fees, taxes, legal and auditing expenses, and
directors’ fees). See JOHN C. BOGLE, BOGLE ON MUTUAL FUNDS 197–201 (1994). In addition,
funds pay for trading costs (brokerage fees) that are charged against fund assets. See U.S. GEN.
ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-03-551T, MUTUAL FUNDS: INFORMATION ON TRENDS IN FEES AND
THEIR RELATED DISCLOSURE 1 (2003) [hereinafter GAO Mutual Fund Fee Report].
32. Tom Lauricella, Independent Directors Strike Back, WALL ST. J., July 5, 2006, at R4.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. See DEL. CODE ANN. Tit. 8, § 141(a) (2006).
36. See generally John C. Bogle, Founder and Former Chairman of the Vanguard Group,
Remarks to the Boston College Law School, Re-Mutualizing the Mutual Fund Industry—The
Alpha & The Omega (Jan. 21, 2004), available at http://www.vanguard.com/bogle_site/sp2004
0121.html (discussing fund directors’ refusal to change the fee structure).
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2. Compliance Office
The fund board also functions as a compliance office, a role outlined in
the 1940 Act and enlarged significantly by SEC rules.37 The board is tasked
with reviewing and approving specified fund practices to regulate conflicts
between the fund and the management firm, and to ensure the management
firm is in regulatory compliance.38 By the SEC’s count, the fund board is
called on under the 1940 Act and its rules to review and approve fund
transactions in 27 different situations, some of which are delegated to the
full board, while others are delegated only to independent directors.
Some compliance functions delegated to the full board include:39
• valuation of portfolio securities that do not have a readily-ascertainable
market price
• setting the time of day when net asset value is determined
• approval of custody contracts (annually) with members of national
securities exchanges, clearing agencies, book-entry systems, and
foreign custodians
• approval of the fund’s code of ethics, which must be designed to
prevent fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative practices by management
firm insiders in connection with personal securities transactions.
Other compliance functions are delegated only to independent directors, on
whom the SEC has “relied extensively” to exempt funds from prohibitions
under the 1940 Act:40
• approval of 12b-1 fees (marketing fees paid from fund assets, as
opposed to loads paid by fund investors when buying and selling
shares)41
• approval of the fund’s auditor (which must be an independent public
accountant)
• approval of securities transactions with the management firm (or its
affiliates) as permitted by various SEC rules
37. See Wang, supra note 3, at 996–1001. Interestingly, the shift of regulatory oversight from
the SEC to fund boards arose mostly from 1975–2000, a period characterized by SEC rule-making
that exempted management firms from conflict-of-interest prohibitions of the 1940 Act on the
condition of approval by independent directors. See Tamar Frankel, The Scope and Jurisprudence
of the Investment Management Regulation, 83 WASH. U. L.Q. 939, 946 (2005) [hereinafter
Frankel, Jurisprudence of Regulation] (providing detailed list).
38. See Paul G. Mahoney, Manager-Investor Conflicts in Mutual Funds, 18 J. OF ECON.
PERSP. 161, 162 (2004) (describing cash flow in mutual funds and the resulting incentives facing
fund managers, brokers, and other third parties and the associated conflicts of interest).
39. Wang, supra note 3, at 994.
40. SEC Staff Report on Independent Chair, supra note 27, at 16.
41. In adopting Rule 12b-1 (which permits use of fund assets to defray marketing expenses),
the SEC commented that “the more capable the disinterested directors are of overseeing the kinds
of activities of investment companies which are of regulatory significance, the more the
Commission will be willing to reduce the regulatory restrictions.” Bearing of Distribution
Expenses by Mutual Funds, Securities Act Release No. 6254, Investment Company Act Release
No. 11,414, 21 SEC Docket 324 (Oct. 28, 1980).
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•

determination (annually) whether participation in joint liability
insurance policies is in the best interests of the fund
• review and approval of fidelity bonds.
The compliance function is largely ministerial, with the board checking
off items on the SEC-provided checklist. Recognizing the emptiness of the
compliance function, the SEC has tried to relieve boards of some of the
tedium, replacing annual review in a number of areas with board action
“only when necessary.”42
Compliance outsourcing to the board and independent directors,
however, is not all encompassing. Certain conflict transactions cannot be
approved by the board or its independent directors, but instead require SEC
approval. For example, transactions with the management firm beyond
those specified in the advisory agreement are prohibited unless they receive
prior approval from the SEC.43 Authorization by the board is not enough.
In performing its compliance function, the board is under no obligation
to set up internal controls and rarely acts as an investigator of management
firm compliance.44 Not surprisingly, fund directors rarely discover
compliance lapses.45 Instead, illegality is typically uncovered by the auditor
or government regulator with the help of a whistle-blower in the
management firm.46 For example, fund boards were largely absent in
identifying or moving to correct the late-trading and market-timing scandals
that shook the mutual fund industry in 2003.47 It was the New York
42. See Frankel, Jurisprudence of Regulation, supra note 37, at 986 (summarizing the 1993
change, which was “intended to enhance the effectiveness of investment company boards by
substituting more meaningful requirements for an annual review requirement” such as requiring
“that directors make and approve changes only when necessary”).
43. See 15 U.S.C. § 80a-17(a), (b) (2000). Under § 17(a), the management firm cannot
“knowingly” sell or purchase securities to or from the mutual fund, except when the fund is
redeeming its own shares or selling them to its investors. Similar restrictions apply to borrowing
from and lending to the mutual fund. Id. Under § 17(b), however, the management firm can apply
to the SEC for an order exempting a proposed transaction. By statute, the SEC is to consider
whether the proposed terms are reasonable and fair and do not involve overreaching, and whether
the proposed transaction is consistent with the mutual fund’s investment policies. Id.
44. Some have speculated that board passivity is a product of the mind-numbing compliance
functions entrusted to it. See, e.g., Tamar Frankel, Money Market Funds, 14 REV. SEC. REG. 913,
915 n.18 (1981) (suggesting that increased compliance tasks and fees paid by fund advisors causes
directors to become more susceptible to control by the management firm).
45. See Victor Brudney, The Independent Director—Heavenly City or Potemkin Village?, 95
HARV. L. REV. 597, 617–19 (1982) (discussing court cases where independent directors failed to
challenge management self-dealing).
46. See Paul E. Kanjorski, Congressman, Remarks during House Hearing, Mutual Funds:
Who’s Looking Out for Investors? 109, 127 (Nov. 6, 2003), available at http://commdocs.house.
gov/committees/bank/hba92982.000/hba92982_1.htm (“[W]e really do not have inside capacity to
understand what these organizations are doing until a whistleblower comes forward or until an
extreme situation occurs where we focus a great deal of light on the subject.”).
47. Mercer E. Bullard, Comments on Martin Lybecker’s Enhanced Corporate Governance, 83
WASH. U. L.Q. 1095, 1098–1101 (2005) [hereinafter Bullard, Comments on Corporate
Governance]. “[M]utual fund scandal was the best evidence that in practice [independent
directors] are not effective watchdogs.” Id. at 1102–03.
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Attorney General, followed by the SEC, who investigated and exposed
most of the illegal and fraudulent practices.48
The attitude of management firms toward the compliance function is
captured by a vignette told by Professor Tamar Frankel:
It was rumored that Securities and Exchange Commission’s examiners
would form monitoring groups. These groups would sit at the offices of
large mutual fund Managers, and supervise their operations, the way FDIC
agents sit at large bank offices. Asked for a reaction to this action, I was
told in confidence how a senior Manager in one large fund complex
reacted. He said something like: “That is sheer waste of money. No one
would speak to these monitors and they will be put in a box and
forgotten.” I was astounded. Here was a golden opportunity to gain the
best guarantee of honesty at no cost. It was an opportunity to show the
world and the regulators that this fund complex had nothing to hide. I
expected the Managers to receive the government monitors with open
arms, show them around, and offer them a comfortable office from which
to supervise and hopefully report and advertise the fund complex’s
compliance with the law. This Manager did not expect the investors to
value trust.49

The SEC has implicitly acknowledged the inadequacies of the fund
board in its compliance function. In the rules responding to the late-trading
and market-timing scandals of 2003, the SEC required management firms to
appoint a compliance officer with significant authority and direct access to
the fund board.50 The SEC stated the hope that these internal compliance
officers would serve as whistle-blowers and alert the SEC to noncompliance by recalcitrant management firms. The implicit doubts about
the fund board could not have been more obvious.
D. DIRECTORS’ DUTIES: EXTERNAL OVERSIGHT
The fund board performs its supervisory and compliance functions with
only minimal external oversight. The 1940 Act gives the SEC only limited
authority, and fund investors even less, to challenge fund directors in
federal court. Federal courts, consistent with the apparent intent of the
legislation, have shunned meaningful review of board activities, particularly
with respect to the setting of management fees. Instead, the 1940 Act
48. Mercer Bullard, The Mutual Fund as a Firm: Frequent Trading, Fund Arbitrage, and the
SEC’s Response to the Mutual Fund Scandal, 42 HOUS. L. REV. 1271, 1272 (2006) (noting that
the scandals resulted in dozens of civil and criminal prosecutions and billions in monetary
sanctions). Mutual fund scandals revolved around fund practices that allowed favored institutional
traders to engage in fund arbitrage, which involves buying fund shares at a discount and
redeeming them once the price has been corrected, with profits coming from other fund
shareholders. Id. at 1285.
49. Frankel, Jurisprudence of Regulation, supra note 37, at 956.
50. Compliance Programs of Investment Companies and Investment Advisers, Investors
Company Act Release 26,299, 68 Fed. Reg. 74,714 (Dec. 24, 2003).
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assumes that directors will be accountable as a matter of state fiduciary law
and directorial professionalism. State courts have deferred to fund boards
under the business judgment rule and state procedural rules on pre-suit
demand. A fledgling movement for more professionalism on fund boards
offers some hope, but is constrained by the structural weaknesses of the
fund board—and ultimately carries no legal weight.
1. SEC Oversight
The SEC has been diffident in its oversight of the fund board.51 Besides
regular (mostly hollow) calls for greater board independence and authority,
the SEC has done little to make fund governance more responsive to
investor needs. The SEC has not armed directors with the information and
other resources to effectively bargain on behalf of fund investors.52 The
SEC has not brought enforcement actions against fund directors for
nonfeasance in negotiating fund fees or controlling excesses in fund
marketing.53 The SEC has neither sued management firms to challenge their
fees nor filed amicus briefs in support of investor litigation making such
charges.54 In short, the SEC has stood by the design of the 1940 Act regime
to outsource regulatory supervision of the management firm to the fund
board.
The SEC’s recent efforts to increase board independence,55 far from
introducing major reforms in board governance, largely codify existing
industry practices:

51. Tobe, supra note 19, at 27 (“‘[F]und directors have done an outstanding job.’” (quoting
SEC Commissioner Steven Wallman)).
52. For example, the SEC does not require that management firms disclose their profits to their
fund boards. See John P. Freeman & Stewart L. Brown, Mutual Fund Advisory Fees: the Cost of
Conflicts of Interest, 26 J. CORP. L. 609, 656–58 (2001) (itemizing SEC inaction).
53. Under § 36(a) of the 1940 Act, the SEC has (limited) authority to seek injunctive action
against fund directors for the “breach of fiduciary duty involving personal misconduct.” 15 U.S.C.
§ 80a-35(a) (2000) (originally enacted as Act of Aug. 22, 1940, ch. 686, Title I, § 36) (action in
federal court against any person who “serves or acts” for a registered investment company).
Section 36 of the 1940 Act is hereinafter cited as 15 U.S.C. § 80a-35. Under § 36(b) of the 1940
Act, the SEC (along with fund investors) can also sue fund directors and the management firm
“for breach of fiduciary duty in respect of [management] compensation.” Id. § 80a-35(b). In
addition, the SEC could also sue fund directors to enjoin the “violation of any provision of this
title, or of any rule, regulation, or order hereunder.” Id. § 80a-41(d) (Supp. II 2002).
54. Freeman & Brown, supra note 52, at 656.
55. In 2001 the SEC conditioned its ten most commonly used exemptive rules on a board
composed of a majority of outside directors. Role of Independent Directors of Investment
Companies, Securities Act No. 7932, Exchange Act Release No. 43,786, Investment Company
Act Release No. 24,816, 66 Fed. Reg. 3734 (Jan. 16, 2001). The rule also required that funds
disclose the fund shares held by directors, including independent directors. In 2004 the SEC
sought to increase the proportion of disinterested directors to 75% and add a requirement that the
board chair be a disinterested director. Investment Company Governance, Investment Company
Act Release No. 26,520, 69 Fed. Reg. 46,378 (July 27, 2004). The rule also would enable
disinterested directors to hire their own staff and lawyers, and to caucus among themselves.
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The rule [mandating a majority of independent directors] will accomplish
little. The board majority requirement is nothing but a warmed-over
rehash of an SEC Investment Management Division proposal advanced
eight years ago. Worse it is beside the point. Today, many, if not most,
funds have a majority of directors who are supposed to be independent of
the external advisor to keep fees and expenses in line. In many cases,
funds’ independent directors already populate funds’ nominating
committees [since funds with Rule 12b-1 plans must have self-nominating
independent directors].56

The SEC has also turned its attention to improving disclosure to fund
investors. Since 1988, the SEC has required that mutual fund prospectuses
include a fee table showing fund fees and charges as a percentage of net
assets.57 In 2004, the SEC required that funds disclose in tabular form (in
their semi-annual and annual reports) the cost in dollars of an investment of
$1,000 that earned the fund’s actual return and incurred the fund’s actual
expenses during that fiscal period.58 Funds must also explain the types of
costs charged to the fund, not just provide an operating expense ratio—
though the SEC does not require a break-down of different fees and
operating expenses.
The SEC, however, has rejected individualized disclosure in account
statements of actual expenses paid by investors—disclosure strongly
recommended in a 2004 GAO report on fee transparency.59 The GAO
asserted “seeing the specific dollar amount paid on shares owned could be
the incentive that some investors need to take action to compare their fund’s
expenses to those of other funds and make more informed investment
decisions on this basis.”60 The SEC concluded such disclosure would not
show fees at comparable funds and was concerned about costs for

56. Freeman & Brown, supra note 52, at 657–58. In addition, the use of outside counsel is
widespread, given the encouragement of the practice by federal courts. See Tannenbaum v. Zeller,
552 F.2d 402, 428 (2d Cir. 1977) (recommending that independent directors receive advice from
independent counsel, rather than counsel for the management firm).
57. See Consolidated Disclosure of Mutual Fund Expenses, Investors Company Act Release
No. 16,244, 53 Fed. Reg. 3192 (1988) (amending Item 3 of Form N-1A to require disclosure of
the fund’s expense ratio). The SEC-mandated disclosure received poor marks. See Robert A.
Robertson, In Search of the Perfect Mutual Fund Prospectus, 54 BUS. LAW. 461, 475 (1999).
58. Shareholder Reports and Quarterly Portfolio Disclosure of Registered Management
Investment Companies, Exchange Act Release No. 33-8393 [2003-2004 transfer binder] Fed. Sec.
L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 87,148 at 89,253 (May 10, 2004) [hereinafter SEC Fund Expense Adopting
Release].
59. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-04-317T, MUTUAL FUNDS: ADDITIONAL
DISCLOSURES COULD INCREASE TRANSPARENCY OF FEES AND OTHER PRACTICES 3 (2004),
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d04317t.pdf.
60. Id. at 8.
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assembling the information when investor accounts are held by financial
intermediaries, such as brokers and financial advisers.61
While the SEC showed concern about costs, absent from its releases on
enhanced fee disclosure is “how investors can, in light of the newly
disclosed information, proceed to the next step . . . whether their interests
are best served by doing some comparative shopping.”62 Without
“processable” information that can be understood and used, the benefits of
disclosure are wasted. As Professors Cox and Payne argue:
Learning that your expense ratio is 1.29% is helpful but more so if this
number can easily be placed in context. What investors wish to know is
how this expense ratio compares with comparable investment
opportunities. Learning that you rate a nine on a scale of ten in a
competition is much more informative than to receive a numerical score
when the boundaries of the scale are unknown. Thus, much like unit
pricing information for grocery products, providing operating expense and
return disclosures in a truly comparative framework is much more likely
to elicit an informed choice on the part of investors than if operating
expenses or return disclosures are made in isolation.63

Of course, this makes sense. But the SEC (like the fund boards it
oversees) seems more concerned with industry sensibilities than protection
of fund investors. True regulatory reform to empower fund investors (and
endanger industry profitability) remains off the table.
2. Federal Judicial Oversight
The 1940 Act does not create a comprehensive system of fiduciary
duties and gives federal courts only narrow authority to oversee fund
boards.64 In the one area where the 1940 Act explicitly permits fund
61. See SEC Fund Expense Adopting Release, supra note 58, at 89,253 (relying on a 2000
industry estimate that individualized disclosure would entail on-going costs of $65 million while
the procedures adopted by the SEC would entail costs of $16 million annually).
62. See James D. Cox & John W. Payne, Mutual Fund Expense Disclosures: A Behavioral
Perspective, 83 WASH. U. L.Q. 907, 929 (2005).
63. Id. at 935–36.
64. The 1940 Act carefully cabins federal judicial review of fund boards. Section 36(a) permits
the SEC (but not explicitly fund investors) to bring actions challenging “a breach of fiduciary duty
involving personal misconduct” by fund directors. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-35(a) (2000). Section 36(b)
authorizes the SEC and fund investors to sue the management firm and fund board with respect to
compensation paid the management firm, which is deemed to have federal fiduciary duties with
respect to the compensation. Id. § 80a-35(b). Congress, however, deftly avoided defining the
standards of “reasonableness” for reviewing management compensation. See Cox & Payne, supra
note 62, at 922–23 (citing INVESTMENT COMPANY AMENDMENTS ACT OF 1969, S. REP. No. 91184 (1969); INVESTMENT COMPANY AMENDMENTS OF 1970, H.R. REP. No. 91-1382 (1970)).
The § 36(b) action, although procedurally a derivative suit, is not subject to a demand
requirement. Daily Income Fund, Inc. v. Fox, 464 U.S. 523, 527 (1984). Nonetheless, it is
burdened by a host of impediments: (1) plaintiffs are not entitled to a jury trial; (2) plaintiffs have
the burden of proof, reversing the usual common law burden on self-dealing fiduciaries to prove
fairness; (3) damages are limited to the year before the action was instituted; (4) damages are
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investors to seek judicial review—the compensation of the fund’s
management firm—the federal courts have refused to involve themselves in
valuing management services and effectively shunned an oversight role.65
Under the articulated standard, management compensation fails review
only if it is “so disproportionately large that it bears no reasonable
relationship to the services rendered and could not have been the product of
arm’s-length bargaining.”66 This means that fee comparisons become
largely irrelevant and that fund directors need not bargain for the least
expensive investment advisory services for the fund. Fee comparisons are
left to fund investors.67
Federal courts reviewing allegations of excessive fees have focused on
director qualifications and the board’s fee-setting process.68 Fund directors
who meet the statutory standards of independence need only show they
followed a prescribed script: frequent meetings (some without
representatives of the management firm), fulsome information (including
presentations, documents, and legal advice from separate counsel), and
documentation of their efforts (negotiation position and strategy, and
evaluation of data).69
In a critique of federal judicial review under the 1940 Act, Professors
Freeman and Brown point out the consistent reluctance of federal courts to
engage in any comparative fee valuation:
Post-Gartenberg courts have improperly denied the relevance of advisory
fee structures actually set by arm’s-length bargaining (as in the pension
fund advisory fee analogy). Low-cost fee structures charged by other
funds (like Vanguard’s) are likewise found essentially irrelevant, if for no
other reason than the fact that, because fund advisors refuse to compete
against each other for advisory business, lower prices are not available to
the fund. . . . The absence of a competitive market has not become a

limited to those resulting from the fiduciary breach, thus preventing punitive damages; and (5)
federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction. See Freeman & Brown, supra note 52, at 642.
65. Gartenberg v. Merrill Lynch Asset Mgmt., Inc., 694 F.2d 923, 928 (2d Cir. 1982)
(eschewing comparative analysis of fund fees, but then adopting deferential “disproportionately
large” test).
66. Id.
67. During the hearings on the 1940 Act, the Chief Counsel of the SEC testified, “There is not
a single provision in section 15 [requiring board approval of the management firm’s advisory and
underwriting agreements] which even remotely assumes to fix what [the management firm] should
be paid as compensation. We feel that is a question for the stockholders to decide.” Investment
Trusts and Investment Companies: Hearings on S. 3580 Before a Subcomm. of the Senate Comm.
on Banking and Currency, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. 252 (1940) (statement of David Schenker, Chief
Counsel, SEC Investment Trust Section).
68. Krinsk v. Fund Asset Mgmt., Inc., 715 F. Supp. 472 (S.D.N.Y. 1988), aff’d 875 F.2d 404
(2d Cir. 1989) (rejecting contentions that § 36(b) of the 1940 Act requires fund directors to
negotiate the “best deal” possible and that excessive profitability alone proves a breach of duty).
69. Stanley J. Friedman, The Role of Outside Directors in Negotiating Investment Company
Advisory Agreements, 24 REV. SEC. & COMMODITIES REG. 49 (1991).
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reason for enhanced scrutiny, but a justification for fitting the judiciary
with blinders.70

Not surprisingly, fund boards (and their management firm sponsors)
have a perfect record in more than twenty years of litigation challenging
fund fees. No management firm, much less a fund director, has been
assessed damages in a case alleging excessive fees.71 Although some cases
have been settled, with payments coming from the management firm or
fund-paid D&O insurance, the settlements only reinforce the prevailing
view that fund directors are not subject to meaningful federal judicial
oversight. The courts have declared the question of “value” to be
intractable, and left it to the professional judgment of fund directors—and
the marketplace.72
Recent attempts to open other avenues of federal judicial review have
fallen on deaf ears. Federal courts have refused to imply private actions for
the “breach of fiduciary duty involving personal misconduct.”73 Leaving no
doubt that the door is closed, some lower courts have explained that even if
a private action could be implied it would not cover board nonfeasance that
did not involve self-dealing or bad faith.74
70. Freeman & Brown, supra note 52, at 651.
71. Id. at 642 n.116.
72. See Castillo v. Dean Witter Discover & Co., 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9489, at *10, *23 n.10
(S.D.N.Y. June 25, 1998) (refusing to require disclosure, comparing fund fees, and chiding fund
investors for not being more careful in the face of conflicts created by the management firm).
73. Section 36(a) of the 1940 Act authorizes the SEC to bring an enforcement action for such
fiduciary breaches, but does not explicitly foreclose private actions. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-35(a) (2000).
Some courts have implied a private action under the section. See Fogel v. Chestnutt, 668 F.2d 100
(2d Cir. 1981). More recent courts, however, have held that the section’s failure to mention private
plaintiffs forecloses a private action. See Olmstead v. Pruco Life Ins. Co., 283 F.3d 429, 432–36
(2d Cir. 2002); Mutchka v. Harris, 373 F. Supp. 2d 1021, 1025–27 (C.D. Cal. 2005); Davis v.
Bailey, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 38204, at *7–16 (D. Colo. Dec. 22, 2005) (No. 05-cv-00042WYD-OES). The cases reflect a jurisprudential shift in implying private actions. See Alexander v.
Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 287 (2001) (announcing abandonment of “ancien regime” for implying
private actions and instructing lower federal courts to focus on statutory intent, principally as
found in statutory text). See also Arthur Gabinet & George Gowen III, The Past and Future of
Implied Causes of Action under the Investment Company Act of 1940, 3 VILL. J. L. & INV. MGMT.
45, 45 (2002).
The refusal to imply a private action flies in the face of legislative urgings. H.R. REP. NO.
96-1341, at 28–29 (1980), as reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4800, 4810–11. Amending the 1940
Act in 1980, the House Report stated,
The Committee wishes to make plain that it expects the courts to imply private rights of
action under this legislation, where the plaintiff falls within the class of persons
protected by the statutory provisions in question. . . . In appropriate instances, for
example, breaches of fiduciary duty involving personal misconduct should be remedied
under Section 36(a) of the Investment Company Act.
Id.

74. See Davis, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 38204, at *15 n.1 (stating that even if § 36(a) authorized
private actions, it would not reach a claim for nonfeasance—namely, the failure of mutual funds to
collect settlement moneys in securities fraud class actions—since the section only reached
“personal misconduct”).
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Federal courts asked to imply greater federal judicial oversight have
pointed to the availability of SEC enforcement and the existing judicial
review of advisory fees as foreclosing broader judicial intervention.75 The
Supreme Court has given its blessing to this judicial state of affairs,
regularly and uniformly denying review of lower court decisions that deny
review of fund boards.76 It seems the Court believes its “watchdog”
rhetoric.
3. State Judicial Oversight
State courts, responsible for enforcing state-based fiduciary duties, have
adopted an even more deferential approach than their federal counterparts.
Imposing a demand requirement on investor derivative suits, state courts
have refused to even hear cases of board nonfeasance.77 Plaintiffs bear the
nearly insuperable burden of showing that a majority of the board—and
thus some of the independent directors—have personal conflicts that would
prevent them from deciding a shareholder demand in good faith.78
Otherwise, the fund board receives the benefit of the doubt under the
business judgment rule.79 Since independent directors, by definition, do not
have direct financial interests in management fees, the chances of
overcoming the business judgment presumption are close to nil. Absent a
showing of payola (beyond regular board compensation) or other corrupt
behavior, state law effectively disavows fiduciary review of mutual fund
activities.
The faith generally placed in independent directors under corporate law
rests on justifications that are inapposite to the mutual fund. In the corporate
context, efficient capital markets price corporate governance and react to
Some have pointed out the inconsistency of this cautious judicial attitude and the 1940 Act
policy of protecting fund investors. See William K. Sjostrom, Tapping the Reservoir: Mutual
Fund Litigation under Section 36(a) of the Investment Company Act of 1940, 54 KANSAS L. REV.
251, 278–82 (2006) (arguing for broad interpretation of “personal conduct” beyond self-dealing
and personal impropriety, to encompass any board decision not made on an informed basis, in
good faith and in the honest belief that the action taken was in the best interests of the fund).
75. See Gabinet & Gowen, supra note 73, at 58–59.
76. See, e.g., Kalish v. Franklin Advisors, Inc., 928 F.2d 590, 591 (2d Cir. 1991), cert. denied,
502 U.S. 818 (1991); Schuyt v. Rowe Price Prime Reserve Fund, Inc., 835 F.2d 45 (2d Cir. 1987),
cert. denied, 485 U.S. 1034 (1988); Grossman v. Johnson, 674 F.2d 115 (1st Cir. 1982), cert.
denied, 459 U.S. 838 (1982); Gartenberg v. Merrill Lynch Asset Mgmt., Inc., 636 F.2d 16 (2d Cir.
1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 910 (1981).
77. See Werbowsky v. Collomb, 766 A.2d 123, 144 (Md. 2001) (dismissing derivative
litigation unless plaintiff can show that “majority of the directors are so personally and directly
conflicted or committed to the decision in dispute that they cannot reasonably be expected to
respond to a demand in good faith and within the ambit of the business judgment rule”). The
standard is the same whether the question is demand futility or board termination of derivative
litigation. See Langevoort, supra note 28, at 1029.
78. Werbowsky, 766 A.2d at 144.
79. Navellier v. Sletten, 262 F.3d 923 (9th Cir. 2001) (affirming jury finding that fund trustees
had not violated their fiduciary duties in terminating the investment advisory contract).
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board governance failures; executive compensation is tied to stock
performance and aligns management interests with those of shareholders;
institutional investors can use (or threaten to use) their voting rights; and
markets in corporate control serve as a backstop if the other mechanisms
fail.80 Although each mechanism has shortcomings, they nonetheless have
served to justify a judicial attitude of abstention.
None of the justifications for judicial abstention, however, applies in
the mutual fund context. Mutual funds do not operate in efficient markets in
which investors price the value of fund management services. Management
compensation is based on asset size and directors are paid in cash, thus
compensation for neither is linked (given the dysfunctional investor market)
to the value of the services provided. Since institutional investors purchase
their management services independently of retail investors, they do not
modulate pricing of retail fund services. Other intermediaries, such as
Morningstar and the financial press, have not been effective in informing
investors and valuing fund management services. To the contrary, they have
exacerbated investor biases. And no control market exists for mutual funds,
since any change of management firms would require board approval or a
shareholder insurgency.81
4. Professional Oversight
Fund directors have lately been viewed as a professional corps—with
special professional, though largely aspirational, responsibilities. The
mutual fund industry has promoted this view.
Proposals for fund governance reform have come from various quarters,
most tellingly, the industry itself. For example, in 1999 an ICI advisory
group recommended:
1) at least two-thirds of each fund board be independent directors, and
independent directors designate one of their own as “lead” independent
director;
2) former officials of the management firm or its affiliates not serve as
independent directors, independent directors be selected and nominated by
incumbent independent directors, independent directors complete an
annual questionnaire on their business, financial and family relationships
with the management firm and other service providers, and fund boards
adopt policies on retirement of directors;

80. See, e.g., Ronald J. Gilson, TRANSPARENCY, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND CAPITAL
MARKETS 4 (The Latin American Corporate Governance Roundtable 2000), available at
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/55/45/1921785.pdf..
81. As Professor Langevoort points out: “Thinking about mutual funds by imagining them
simply as a species of ‘corporations’ in a way that is directly informed by contemporary corporate
law theory is completely misguided.” Langevoort, supra note 28, at 1032.
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3) independent directors establish director compensation, fund directors
invest in funds on whose boards they serve, and fund boards obtain D&O
insurance and/or indemnification from the fund “to ensure the
independence and effectiveness of independent directors;”
4) independent directors meet separately from management when
considering the fund’s advisory and underwriting contracts, and
independent directors have qualified independent counsel and have
express authority to consult with the fund’s independent auditors or other
experts, as appropriate;
5) fund boards establish an audit committee (composed entirely of
independent directors) that would supervise the fund’s independent
auditors; and
6) fund directors evaluate periodically the board’s effectiveness, new fund
directors receive appropriate orientation, and all fund directors keep
abreast of industry and regulatory developments. 82

Many of the “best practices” proposals, however, simply call for
conduct that is already the industry norm.83 For example, many fund groups
have moved on their own to increase the proportion of independent
directors on their boards. The SEC estimates that at least 60% of fund
boards meet the 75% independent-directors threshold.84 The shift to
independent chairs has been even more pronounced, with 43% of fund
boards led by an independent chair, up from less than 20% only a few years
ago.85
Has the director professionalism movement borne fruit? The industry
says yes. For example, in 2005 fees were reduced on 808 mutual funds,
while they rose on 263 funds. In comparison, fees rose on 417 funds and
fell on 367 in 2003.86 But the net 545 funds that reduced fees in 2005
represent less than 10% of the 8000-fund industry.
Ultimately, gains in independent board membership and more active
negotiation of fund fees do not change the essential dynamic of mutual fund
governance. Fund boards can negotiate only at the margin. The threat to
buy fund services elsewhere, always present in a real negotiation, is mostly
empty (sometimes even ludicrous) in a negotiation of fund fees or other
terms of the management contract. Moreover, the composition of fund
boards with executives sympathetic to the profit motives of the
82. INVESTMENT COMPANY INSTITUTE, REPORT OF THE ADVISORY GROUP ON BEST
PRACTICES FOR FUND DIRECTORS iii–iv (1999), http://www.ici.org/pdf/rpt_best_practices.pdf.
See also Freeman & Brown, supra note 52, at 658–59 n.200 (summarizing ICI advisory group
recommendations).
83. See Freeman & Brown, supra note 52, at 659 n.221.
84. Lauricella, supra note 32, at R4 (reporting end-of-year 2004 data from the Investment
Company Institute).
85. Id.
86. Id. at R1 (reporting data from Lipper, Inc.).
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management firm, cemented by the high levels of compensation for many
fund directors, is hardly a harbinger of reform. For example, the $3 million
in fee reductions wrangled by the AIM board in 2005 came at a not
insignificant cost.87 In 2005, the AIM independent trustees received total
pay, including deferred retirement benefits, of approximately $4.4 million,
with the independent chair receiving $359,000 for his board service.88
II. EVALUATION OF OUTSOURCING
Has outsourcing to the mutual fund board worked? The mutual fund
industry has argued that mutual fund boards, and the funds they supervise,
operate in a “vigorous and highly competitive” market.89 But many outside
the industry, including the SEC, have questioned the power of the market
and the effectiveness of fund boards in supervising management firms—
primarily as relates to fees and costs. More recently, some have also pointed
to the failure of the board in reining in aggressive and misguided marketing
practices devised by management firms that prey on investor cognitive
biases.90
Consider the assumptions that undergird the regulatory outsourcing to
mutual fund boards and the evidence of how that outsourcing has worked.
A. DEBATE OVER THE FUND BOARD
Oversight of mutual fund boards is built on certain hopeful
assumptions. The fund industry regularly trumpets its efficiency and the
market pressure that fund investors can wield. To the extent there are
market inefficiencies, the SEC has sought to empower the fund board by
reforming the rules governing fund board composition. Thus, courts
reviewing the performance of fund boards have been inclined to use the
same standards of deferential review applied to corporate boards, on the
assumptions that market discipline by investors and regulatory oversight by
the SEC make judicial intervention unnecessary.
1. Market Efficiency
At first glance, the mutual fund industry shows the classic hallmarks of
market competitiveness. The supply side of the market has low barriers to
entry and has shown great fluidity, with small funds regularly displacing
87. Id. at R4.
88. See AIM INVESTMENT SECURITIES FUNDS, STATEMENT

OF ADDITIONAL INFORMATION,
APPENDIX D, TRUSTEE COMPENSATION TABLE (2006), https://www.aiminvestments.com.
89. How the Financial System Can Best Be Shaped to Meet the Needs of the American People,
Financial Deregulation: Hearing on H.R. 5734: The Financial Institutions Equity Act of 1984
Before the House Comm. on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 1359
(1984) (statement of David Silver, President, Investment Company Institute).
90. JOHN C. BOGLE, THE BATTLE FOR THE SOUL OF CAPITALISM 164–65 (2005) (arguing that
salesmanship triumphed over stewardship).
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larger funds.91 The demand side is characterized by potent information and
liquidity rights that allow fund investors easily to ascertain fund
performance and to redeem their shares and move to better-performing or
lower-cost funds.92
The industry’s argument for market efficiency, repeated by some
finance theorists, has superficial appeal.93 SEC disclosure rules arm
investors with extensive information about fund investment policies,
returns, management fees, and other costs.94 And for those investors
unwilling to wade through the disclosure documents, information
intermediaries (such as Morningstar, newsletters, financial press) provide
“extensive coverage and analysis of mutual funds.”95 The asset-based
compensation structure, which allows the management firm to share in
superior investment results as the asset base increases, provides incentives
to both attract and retain fund investors.
The industry, until the late-trading and market-timing stories broke in
2003, regularly trumpeted its mostly scandal-free record. By all
appearances, portfolio securities seemed to be in safe hands and
management firms (under the watchful eye of majority-independent boards)
complied with the rules of the game—multitudinous and ample as they are.
Ultimately, the proof is in the pudding. The record of mutual fund fees,
expenses, portfolio turnover, investment strategies, fund design, and
marketing has received a good deal of attention in the finance literature.
The picture that emerges (described below) is not flattering for the industry.
At almost every level, it seems that fund management firms have been
systematically taking advantage of the informational and cognitive
deficiencies of fund investors. Market efficiency, plausible in theory, seems
not to have functioned in practice.

91. WILLIAM J. BAUMOL, STEPHEN M. GOLDFELD, LILLI A. GORDON & MICHAEL F. KOEHN,
THE ECONOMICS OF MUTUAL FUND MARKETS: COMPETITION VERSUS REGULATION 117 (Karl
Brunner & Paul W. MacAvoy eds., 1990) (finding that under the Justice Department’s antitrust
guidelines, mutual fund advisers compete in an unconcentrated market, with the 30 largest
complexes experiencing a declining market share, and new smaller entrants taking market shares
from larger rivals).
92. SEC, Invest Wisely: An Introduction to Mutual Funds, available at http://www.sec.gov/
investor/pubs/inwsmf.htm.
93. See Paula A. Tkac, Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta, Mutual Funds: Temporary Problem
or Permanent Morass?, 98 ECON. REV. 1, 15 (2004), available at http://www.frbatlanta.org/file
legacydocs/erq404_tkac.pdf (“The mutual fund industry is . . . no different than any other
competitive industry. [Fund investors] exert their power via their aggregated purchasing decisions
in a marketplace replete with choices.”). Edward B. Rock, Foxes and Hen Houses?: Personal
Trading by Mutual Fund Managers, 73 WASH. U. L.Q. 1601, 1641 (1994) (“[P]roduct markets
that are as competitive as the market for mutual funds . . . provide firms with strong incentives to
adopt optimal personal trading policies.”).
94. Advertising by Investment Companies, Investment Company Act Release No. 16,245, 53
Fed. Reg. 3,868 (Feb. 10, 1988).
95. Wang, supra note 3, at 965–66.
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2. Structural Critique
The SEC, on a regular basis, has questioned the structural effectiveness
of the board and, specifically, its independent members.96 The SEC’s
solution to the fund board’s perceived weaknesses has been to strengthen
the board’s structural independence and authority.97
Most recently, the SEC has proposed rules that would effectively
require that the board be composed of 75 percent independent directors and
that the board chair be an independent director.98 The SEC proposal, which
has met judicial resistance, reflects the long-standing regulatory belief (even
faith) in the ability of independent directors to serve the interests of fund
investors unable themselves to discipline wayward or faithless fund
management.
Observers have long noted the structural bias inherent in the fund
board, given the method by which non-management directors are selected
and their professional and personal ties of directors to the management
firm.99
In a recent study of fees charged by mutual funds, Professors Freeman
and Brown concluded:
Scholarly articles published by finance academics have ridiculed boardapproved 12b-1 fees paid by fund shareholders. Law review commentators
offer uncomplimentary evaluations of those who control fund management
and policies. The SEC has weighed in, questioning “whether changes are
needed in the current system.” Another federal agency, the General
Accounting Office, recently issued a detailed report finding that mutual
funds generally do not attempt to compete on the basis of costs (i.e., price
competition is muted). . . . [D]ecades of SEC-commissioned studies, rulemaking, and jawboning have led to a system that, for the most part, works

96. SEC Staff Report Protecting Investors, supra note 25, at 266 (examining existing
governance model to increase board effectiveness, and concluding that board governance is
“fundamentally sound”).
97. See SEC REPORT ON PUBLIC POLICY IMPLICATION OF INVESTMENT COMPANY GROWTH,
H.R. REP. NO. 89-2337 (1966) (finding inadequate the independence standard under the 1940 Act,
since independent directors are often close to the adviser through business or family
relationships). In response, Congress amended the 1940 Act in 1970 to tighten the standards of
independence and to permit fund investors to seek judicial review of management compensation.
15 U.S.C.A. § 80a-2(a)(19) (West 2006) (defining “interested person”); Id. § 80a-35(b) (providing
a private action to remedy fiduciary breaches involving fees paid management firm).
98. Investment Company Governance, Investment Company Act Release No. 26,520, 83 SEC
Docket 1384 (July 27, 2004). Curiously, the SEC has stated that its rule mandating an independent
board chair was not adopted “as a means of enhancing fund financial performance or reducing
fund expenses.” SEC Staff Report on Independent Chair, supra note 27, at 2. Instead, the change
was said to improve compliance and ensure fund boards focus on the long-term interests of fund
investors. Id. One is left to wonder why improved compliance and an investor focus should not
produce financial results.
99. See Brudney, supra note 45, at 612.
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beautifully for those who sell funds to the public, or sell services to funds,
but much less admirably for the industry’s investors.100

In the end, fund directors may perceive their role as supercilious. Fund
investors receive disclosure, have available comparative information, and
can move their mutual fund investments as they choose. On the assumption
of consumer sovereignty, the board is at most a bureaucratic compliance
office.
3. Doctrinal Critique
More recently, academic commentators have identified the doctrinal
deference to fund boards, even when composed by a majority of
independent directors.101 They have criticized the judicial approach of
federal courts (which defer to state law on questions of board demand and
termination of investor suits) and state courts (which defer to independent
directors under the business judgment rule).
The transliteration of traditional corporate governance norms to the
mutual fund context is simplistic—and misplaced. Unlike their counterparts
in operating companies, fund directors are not subject to the threat of
shareholder insurgencies or takeover pressures; they lack the realistic power
to replace fund management; and they generally rely on the management
firm for information, direction, and compensation. And the linking of
compensation to performance—as with stock-based compensation in
operating companies or performance-based compensation in hedge funds—
is diluted by the asset-based compensation in mutual funds.
The doctrinal gap, rather than narrowing, has been widening. Recently,
courts have largely sidestepped the wave of investor litigation arising from
the spate of late-trading and marketing-timing scandals. Federal courts have
refused to imply federal fiduciary duties, and state courts have refused to
relieve investors of the board demand and termination procedures of state
corporate law.102
100. Freeman & Brown. supra note 52, at 611–13 (citations omitted).
101. See Langevoort, supra note 28, at 1017–18.
102. Federal judicial abstention in this area is not new. In a line of Supreme Court cases on
whether fund boards are bound by federal law or state law, the resounding answer has been in
favor of state law. See Burks v. Lasker, 441 U.S. 471, 472 (1979) (finding that state law governs
termination of derivative suit, unless inconsistent with policies of 1940 Act); see generally Kamen
v. Kemper Fin. Servs. Inc., 500 U.S. 90 (1991) (finding that state law controls question of board
demand). Only when there is clear federal policy, such as the express private action under § 36(b)
to overcome the perceived inability of independent directors to control overreaching management,
does federal law control. Daily Income Fund, Inc. v. Fox, 464 U.S. 523, 527 (1984) (finding no
demand requirement under § 36(b)).
Even if the federal courts were to expand their currently cabined view of implied private
actions under the 1940 Act, fund investors would face the daunting challenge of bringing
derivative claims in the face of board demand and dismissal tools available under state law—
primarily, Delaware and Maryland where most mutual funds are organized. See Scalisi v. Fund
Asset Management L.P., 380 F.3d 133, 142 (2d Cir. 2004) (applying Maryland’s approach that
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Summarizing the sad state of the fund board, Professor Wang in a
comprehensive article on the board-centric structure of U.S. mutual funds
concluded:
To evaluate the institutional competence of the board, it is essential to
inquire into the board’s independence and informational advantage. . . .
Because directors are not truly independent, they are vulnerable to
coalition politics. In addition, because directors have a limited
informational advantage over investors, it may not be realistic to expect
them to strike the best deals for investors. In this respect, traditional
monitoring devices such as fiduciary duties and incentive-compatible
contracts are not effective devices to discipline the performance of the
board.103

B. EMPIRICAL DATA ON MUTUAL FUND MARKETS
How has the mutual fund market performed? Rather than consider the
structural and doctrinal effectiveness of the fund board, the more relevant
question is how fund directors have measurably fulfilled their role as
“watchdogs” for fund investors. Viewing fund governance as a black box,
the question is how well fund boards have performed their functions.
Even if fund governance (the supply market) is not working, it is
possible that fund investors (the demand market) have exercised their
informational and liquidity rights to protect themselves. Again, the question
is whether fund investors have exercised their buy/sell rights to demand
good performance at low cost. The rich finance literature on the functioning
of the mutual fund markets over the past several years provides some
answers. The studies reveal a largely dysfunctional supply market with fund
boards performing poorly nearly all the tasks assigned to them.104 The same
is true for the demand market, where fund investors by and large possess
neither the information nor acumen to protect themselves. Although some
recent data suggest greater consumerism among fund investors, the change
appears to be at the margin.
1. Board Performance
Academic studies tell a consistent and disturbing story of the failure of
fund boards to negotiate lower fees in the face of economies of scale
generated by rising fund assets and enhanced computer and teledemand and termination by independent directors is subject to review under the business judgment
rule).
103. Wang, supra note 3, at 1008.
104. To date, no studies look at the performance of fund boards in supervising late-trading and
market-timing practices. The brazen nature of the practices in some fund families raises questions
about the effectiveness of fund boards at this, their most basic, task. Nonetheless, whether because
of board pressure or management firm response to the SEC’s and Attorney Elliot Spitzer’s
enforcement actions, there is reason to believe the industry has responded to ameliorate the
practices.
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communications technologies. After reviewing some of the academic
literature, the General Accounting Office (GAO) concluded that fund
boards “may be keeping fees at higher levels because of [a] focus on
maintaining fees within the range of other funds.”105
Fund boards have also failed investors in the supervision and approval
of marketing by management firms. The studies surveyed by the GAO
found that “the information currently provided does not sufficiently make
investors aware of the level of fees they pay.”106 As one study concluded,
perhaps kindly, “funds do not compete primarily on the basis of their
operating expense fees.”107 Instead, funds seem to compete on the basis of
marketing—with advertisement focused on recent performance results.
Board hiring/retention of management firm
• Business connections between fund directors and advisory firms affect
hiring, compensation, and performance. Fund boards preferentially hire
advisory firms having more business relationships with fund directors.
Fund advisors receive higher pay when more connected to the fund
directors. Preferential hiring and pay is not compensated by higher
performance. In fact, greater connections correspond to a decrease in
fund return, before and after advisory fees, of about 1% per year.108
Board negotiation of advisory contracts and fees
• Expense ratios have risen, even as fund assets have grown and fund
management has become more efficient. Weighted average expense
ratios for all mutual funds (stock and bond funds) rose from 0.73% in
1979 to 0.94% in 1999—a nearly 30% increase.109 Weighted average
expense ratios for equity funds grew from 0.64% in 1980 to 0.92% in
2004—an increase of more than 40%—even as equity fund assets rose
from $45 billion to $4,034 billion.110
• Negotiation of advisory contracts appears to be perfunctory.
Contractual renegotiations are “rare event[s]” that happen in only 10%

105. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, MUTUAL FUND FEES: ADDITIONAL DISCLOSURE COULD
ENCOURAGE PRICE COMPETITION 8, 47 (2000) [hereinafter GAO Mutual Fund Disclosure Report]
(noting that some studies “found that fees had been rising”).
106. Id. at 7, 76 (“[A]cademic researchers [and others] saw problems with the fee disclosures”
by mutual funds).
107. Id. at 62.
108. Camelia M. Kuhnen, Social Networks, Corporate Governance and Contracting in the
Mutual Fund Industry 6 (Unpublished Working Paper, 2006), available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=849705 [hereinafter Kuhnen, Social Networks].
109. SEC Division of Investment Management: Report on Mutual Fund Fees and Expenses 20
Table 2 (2000), http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/feestudy.htm. The report determined that the
increase in average expense ratios was primarily due to greater use of 12b-1 fees to pay for fund
distribution costs. Id. at 21.
110. BOGLE, supra note 90, at 155 Box 7.2 (finding that unweighted expense ratios have risen
even faster than weighted expense ratios, from 0.94% in 1980 to 1.56% in 2004).
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of funds.111 When they do happen, they produce lower fees for bottom
and mid-performing funds that correlate to later positive performance,
as well as net inflows. It is “puzzling” that fund boards do not actively
renegotiate advisory contracts, given the apparent benefits.112
Fund boards accept higher expense ratios for high-performance
funds.113 Although overall management fees decline somewhat as fund
size increases, administrative costs decline more rapidly. That is,
advisory fees constitute a profit center for management firms.114
Advisory fees charged mutual funds are not competitive with advisory
fees charged pension funds. Advisory fee ratios for public pension
clients are roughly half of that for comparable actively managed equity
mutual funds—even though the average such mutual fund has assets
that are nearly three times larger than the average pension portfolio.115
On a size-standardized basis, the average actively managed mutual fund
pays advisory fees of 0.67%, compared to 0.28% paid by pension
portfolios.116

111. Camelia M. Kuhnen, Dynamic Contracting in the Mutual Fund Industry 8–9 (Unpublished
Working Paper, 2005), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=687530.
112. Kuhnen, Social Networks, supra note 108, at 1 (discussing a study of negotiations of
advisory contracts from 1994–2002).
113. Jerold B. Warner & Joanna Shuang Wu, Changes in Mutual Fund Advisory Contracts 2
(Simon Graduate School of Business Administration, Working Paper No. FR 05-14, 2005),
http://ssrn.com/abstract=841565 (“[H]igh asset growth increases the likelihood of a contract
change.”). Advisory “contract changes often shift the percentage fee up or down by more than a
fourth, with fee increases and decreases roughly equally likely.” Id. “[F]unds with superior
market-adjusted performance are able to raise fees,” yet “[r]ate decreases reflect economies of
scale associated with growth.” Id. at 6, 2.
114. Freeman & Brown, supra note 52, at 625 (using a sample of 2161 funds in 1999, with a
total market value of $2.2 trillion, finding that “advisory and administrative costs decline as fund
size increases, but with administrative costs declining much more rapidly”). The authors
calculated that if advisory costs had declined by the same percentage as administrative costs,
average advisory fees for funds with assets above $5 billion would have been 28 basis points,
rather than 46 basis points. Thus, assuming equal economies of scale for advisory fees and
administrative fees, the larger funds charge excess advisory fees of about $2.5 billion annually. Id.
115. Management firms charge retail mutual funds “systematically higher” advisory fees than
they charge their pension fund clients, for essentially the same service. Freeman & Brown, supra
note 52, at 628, 630–32 (analyzing fee data collected in 1999 from 36 public pension funds that
had placed 220 equity portfolios under active management with outside investment advisers,
representing $97.5 billion in assets, finding that comparable mutual funds pay about twice as
much as the pension fund clients, with the difference more pronounced as the fund/portfolio size
increases). The disparity has existed over time. A Wharton study conducted in 1962, looking at a
sample of 54 management firms with both mutual fund clients and other clients, found that fee
rates charged mutual funds were at least 50% higher in 39 out of the 54 cases, 200% higher in 24
of the cases, and 500% or more higher in 9 of the cases. WHARTON SCHOOL OF FINANCE &
COMMERCE, A STUDY OF MUTUAL FUNDS, H.R. REP. NO. 2274-87, at 489–94 (1962).
116. Freeman & Brown, supra note 52, at 633. The findings are dramatic for largecapitalization funds, where mutual funds pay weighted average advisory fees of 52 basis points,
compared to 21 basis points for comparable pension fund portfolios. The fee differential is further
exacerbated in view of average fund size, with the average large-cap mutual fund ($2 billion)
almost four times larger than the average pension fund portfolio ($555 million). Id. at 635. That is,
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Higher advisory fees do not buy better performance. High-fee funds
under-perform low-fee funds—even before factoring in fees. Advisory
fee levels, generally a percentage of fund total net assets, increase as a
result of recent superior fund performance.117
Actively managed mutual funds are more expensive than they appear.
Most actively managed funds engage in shadow indexing, while
charging fund investors for active management. On average, most of
the variance between the fund’s stated active managed assets and the
fund’s actual shadow indexed assets is explained by the fund’s
benchmark index.118 Separating active assets from passive assets, the
mean expense ratio for the active portion of the portfolio of activelymanaged large-cap equity mutual funds of “5.14% runs more than
500% higher than the published expense ratio of 0.77%.”119

Board approval of loads
• Nearly two-thirds of equity funds impose distribution fees, as load
charges paid directly by fund investors or as annual marketing fees paid
pursuant to Rule 12b-1. The true cost of distribution fees to investors is
hard to measure because “fund companies have developed distribution
arrangements that differ in both the magnitude and timing of fees
paid.”120
• While 12b-1 fees (paid from fund assets) increase the fund’s market
share, there is “no evidence” current or new investors derive any benefit
from 12b-1 fees.121 Funds with 12b-1 fees have higher expense ratios
and are more likely to fail. Fund investors pay for additional marketing,
but garner no additional investment returns—a “dead weight cost.”122
management firms charge the average large cap mutual fund $10.4 million, while they charge the
average pension fund portfolio $1.2 million—for essentially the same service.
117. Warner & Wu, supra note 113, at 26–27. Also finding that advisory fee rates decrease
when economies of scale exist and they are associated with growth. Id. at 6.
118. Ross M. Miller, Measuring the True Cost of Active Management by Mutual Funds 11
(Unpublished Working Paper, 2005), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=746926.
119. Id. at 12.
120. Miles Livingston & Edward S. O’Neal, The Cost of Mutual Fund Distribution Fees, 21 J.
FIN. RES. 205, 206 (1998). The study produced a “simple methodology” that expresses “present
value of distribution costs as fraction of original investment for multiple-class fees” during any
potential holding period, allowing direct comparison of the effect on investors of distribution fees
for different sales arrangements. Id. at 214.
121. Ajay Khorana & Henri Servaes, Conflicts of Interest and Competition in the Mutual Fund
Industry 1–2 (Unpublished Working Paper, 2004), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=240596
(studying the period from 1979 to 1998, when mutual fund industry assets grew enormously, the
number of active funds tripled, and the market share of each fund declined).
122. Stephen P. Ferris & Don M. Chance, The Effect of 12b-1 Plans on Mutual Fund Expense
Ratios: A Note, 42 J. FIN. 1077, 1082 (1987) (describing 12b-1 fees as “a dead-weight cost”);
Robert W. McLeod & D.K. Malhotra, A Re-examination of the Effect of 12b-1 Plans on Mutual
Fund Expense Ratios, 72 J. FIN. RES. 231, 239 (1994) (stating that 12b-1 fees are “a dead weight
cost” to fund investors that has been increasing over time); Antonio Apap & John M. Griffith, The
Impact of Expenses on Mutual Fund Performance, 11 J. FIN. PLAN. 76, 80 (1998) (concluding that
for variety of equity funds, 12b-1 fees do not add to funds’ performance).
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The number of funds with 12b-1 fees is growing, as is the level of 12b1 fees.123 Increasingly, 12b-1 fees are charged in funds closed to new
investors, “almost all of which are load funds.”124
Load funds, which directly charge investors for marketing expenses, do
not out-perform no-load funds. Even before adjusting for loads in
returns, no-load funds beat their load counterparts. When loads are
figured in, no-load funds perform much better than load funds. And
comparing load funds, there is no significant difference in performance
between high-load funds and low-load funds even after adjusting for
loads.125
Load funds target less-knowledgeable investors and charge higher
expenses. The average annual expense ratio of load equity funds has
widened since the early 1990s and by 2000–2004 was 50 basis points
higher than no-load equity funds.126
In the 1990s, most funds with front-end loads added new share classes,
which allowed investors instead to pay annual fees and/or back-end
charges. Multiple-class funds attracted shorter-horizon investors,
resulting in an increase in fund volatility and a significant drop in fund
performance.127
Expensive load funds, without minimum-balance requirements, are
targeted at investors in less affluent, less educated, and ethnic minority
neighborhoods—a kind of “predatory” money management.128

Board supervision of fund marketing
• Fund investors who purchase through brokers or financial advisors pay
“unjustified” higher costs. Broker customers are often directed to hardto-find funds, which charge substantially higher fees and provide lower
risk-adjusted returns than directly placed funds. “[B]roker-channel
funds exhibit no superior asset allocation. . . . While we cannot seem to

123. William P. Dukes, Philip C. English II & Sean M. Davis, Mutual Fund Mortality, 12b-1
Fees, and the Net Expense Ratio, 29 J. FIN. RES. 235, 236 (2006).
124. Todd Houge & Jay Wellman, The Use and Abuse of Mutual Fund Expenses 13
(Unpublished Working Paper, 2006), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=880463.
125. Matthew R. Morey, Should You Carry the Load? A Comprehensive Analysis of Load and
No-Load Mutual Fund Out-of-Sample Performance, 27 J. BANKING FIN. 1245 (2003) (using
sample of funds free of survivorship bias, evaluating performance across different performance
metrics and different ages and styles of funds; finding differences to be statistically significant at
one percent level across different performance metrics).
126. Houge & Wellman, supra note 124, at 3.
127. Vikram K. Nanda, Z. Jay Wang & Lu Zheng, The ABCs of Mutual Funds: A Natural
Experiment on Fund Flows and Performance 3 (Unpublished Working Paper, 2003), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=510325.
128. Christopher J. Malloy & Ning Zhu, Mutual Fund Choices and Investor Demographics 1
(Eur. Fin. Ass’n 2004 Maastricht Meetings, Working Paper No. 3377, 2004), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=556225.
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locate tangible benefits delivered by brokers, we remain open to the
possibility that substantial intangible benefits exist.” 129
Fund families create the illusion of high-rated funds by merging lowperforming funds into high-performing funds—marketing the
survivor’s healthy past performance. Funds disappear at a rate of
approximately 3.6% a year primarily because of multi-year poor
performance.130 The resulting “survivor bias” results in overstatement
of fund family performance, by air-painting out below-average funds
from the family portrait.131
Fund boards rarely close funds to new investors, even when the fund
has reached an optimal size. For actively managed funds, returns (both
before and after fees and expenses) decline with lagged fund size. The
relationship is most pronounced in funds that invest in small and
illiquid stocks, where scale adversely affects liquidity.132
Funds with front-end loads have recently introduced additional share
classes, “allowing investors to replace front-end loads with higher
annual fees and/or back-end charges.”133 While increasing fund cash
flows by attracting shorter-horizon investors, the result has been a
significant drop in fund performance. In fact, fund performance drops
and volatility rises as funds increase the proportion of short-horizon
investors.134

Board supervision of fund investment strategies
• Morningstar ratings, on which fund investors irrationally rely, skew the
behavior of fund managers. Funds that achieve high ratings tend to
increase their risk levels, resulting in a “significant fall off” in
performance as managers are unable to “load on momentum stock”
after the fund receives the initial five-star rating.135

129. Daniel B. Bergstresser, John M.R. Chalmers & Peter Tufano, Assessing the Costs and
Benefits of Brokers in the Mutual Fund Industry 36 (Unpublished Working Paper, 2006),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=616981. The paper found that investors buying brokered
funds underperform direct-channel funds, even before deduction of distribution-related
expenses. Id.
130. Mark M. Carhart, Jennifer N. Carpenter, Anthony W. Lynch & David K. Musto, Mutual
Fund Survivorship, 15 REV. FIN. STUD. 1439, 1443–45 (2002). “[The survivor bias is] 0.07% for
one-year samples, but a significantly larger 1% for samples longer than 15 years.” Id. at 1460.
131. Id. at 1439.
132. Joseph S. Chen, Harrison G. Hong, Ming Huang & Jeffrey D. Kubik, Does Fund Size
Erode Mutual Fund Performance? The Role of Liquidity and Organization, 94 AM. ECON. REV.
1276 (2004). The study found that even after adjusting returns by various performance
benchmarks, fund performance “increases with the size of the other funds in the same family.” Id.
at 1293.
133. Nanda, Wang & Zheng, supra note 127, at 1.
134. Id. at 22.
135. Matthew R. Morey, The Kiss of Death: A 5-Star Morningstar Mutual Fund Rating, 3 J.
INV. MGMT. 41 (2005) (examining effect 5-star Morningstar mutual fund rating has on fund
performance, strategy, risk-taking, expenses, and portfolio turnover during three-year period after
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Fund managers adapt their investment strategy in the last part of a
calendar year according to their performance in the first part, in
particular taking greater risk to keep a high Morningstar rating from the
beginning of the year.136
Annual trading costs for equity funds average 0.78% of fund assets.
Trading costs are negatively related to fund returns, and there is no
evidence that average trading costs are recovered in higher overall fund
returns. Trading appears to have a greater drag on fund returns than
turnover.137
Fund over-trading often occurs because of the presence of short-term
investors in long-term funds. Fund managers can use observable
investor characteristics to predict investment horizons when investors
open an account. The pooling in the same fund of long-term investors
and short-term investors costs long-term investors 0.51% in foregone
annual returns.138
Larger fund families aggressively market their “winning” funds (the
previous year’s best performers) and allocate extra manager resources
to these funds.139 In fact, an investment strategy that purchases a fund
family’s past-year winners and shorts its past-year losers produces
abnormal positive returns. The strategy is particularly successful in
larger fund families, suggesting the latitude of larger families to allocate
resources unevenly between funds.140
Fund families strategically allocate performance across member funds
to favor those more likely to generate future inflows and higher fee
income. Strategic cross-fund subsidization of “high” funds at the
expense of “low” funds is between 6 to 28 basis points of extra net-ofstyle performance per month.141 This preferential allocation occurs with
respect to IPO deals and opposite trades (sometimes actual cross-

initial 5-star rating; findings “robust across different performance measures and different samples
of funds”).
136. Alexei P. Goriaev, Federic Albert Palomino & Andrea Prat, Mutual Fund Tournament:
Risk Taking Incentives Induced by Ranking Objectives (Ctr. for Econ. Policy Research Discussion
Paper No. 2794, 2004), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=270304.
137. John M.R. Chalmers, Roger M. Edelen & Gregory B. Kadlec, An Analysis Of Mutual Fund
Trading Costs (1999) (Unpublished Working Paper), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=
195849.
138. See Woodrow T. Johnson, Predictable Investment Horizons and Wealth Transfers among
Mutual Fund Shareholders, 59 J. FIN. 1979, 2012 (2004).
139. See Donald W. Glazer, A Study of Mutual Fund Complexes, 119 U. PA. L. REV. 205, 228
(1970) (finding investors are more concerned with the relative performance of aggressive mutual
funds).
140. Ilan Guedj & Jannette Papastaikoudi, Can Mutual Fund Families Affect the Performance
of Their Funds? 24 (Unpublished Working Paper, 2003), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=
467282 (study of funds in large fund families).
141. José-Miguel Gaspar, Massimo Massa & Pedro P. Matos, Favoritism in Mutual Fund
Families? Evidence on Strategic Cross-Fund Subsidization, 61 J. FIN. 73, 102 (2006), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=557078.
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trading) among “high” and “low value” funds in the same fund
complex.142
Fund boards with a greater proportion of independent directors seem to
supervise the management firm more diligently than low-proportion
funds. Fund performance and the likelihood of replacing underperforming fund managers increases as the proportion of independent
directors increases.143
2. Empirical Data on Investor/Market Effectiveness

Not only does the finance literature raise doubts about fund governance,
it also reveals the investor market to be informationally inefficient—the
same finding that motivated the 1940 Act and its outsourcing of fund
supervision to the fund board.144 Recent studies show fund investors
continue to lack the investment acumen, relevant information, and ability to
protect their own interests.145 The notion, powerful in theory, that mutual
fund investors can discipline wayward management firms by exercising
their easy “entry/exit” rights has proved mostly empty in practice. Study
after study makes clear that most fund investors are unable to fend for
themselves.146
Investor response to fund fees
• Investors are often ignorant of expenses charged by their funds.
According to a survey of fund investors, fewer than 20% could estimate
expenses for the largest fund they held.147 Even sophisticated fund

142. Id.
143. Bill Ding & Russ R. Wermers, Mutual Fund Performance and Governance Structure: The
Role of Portfolio Managers and Boards of Directors 4 (Unpublished Working Paper, 2005),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=687273 (performing a comprehensive analysis of the
relationship between performance and governance structure of open-end, domestic-equity mutual
funds from 1985–2002).
144. From the beginning, it has been understood that disclosure to investors is not enough. As
SEC Commissioner Robert Healy testified in the hearings on the Investment Company Act, “there
are certain practices that have happened in connection with investment companies that I think
everybody agrees . . . ought to be stopped, and they cannot be stopped by mere disclosure.” SEC
Staff Report on Independent Chair, supra note 27, at 28 n. 14.
145. See generally, Stephen Choi, Regulating Investors Not Issuers: A Market Based Proposal,
88 CAL. L. REV. 279 (2000) (proposing a system regulating investors based on their
sophistication).
146. Reviewing the academic literature, the General Accounting Office came essentially to the
same conclusion. GAO Mutual Fund Disclosure Report, supra note 105, at 7, 76 (“[Academic
studies] indicated that the information currently provided does not sufficiently make investors
aware of the level of fees they pay,” and some academic researchers and others “saw problems
with the fee disclosures [by mutual funds].”).
147. Gordon J. Alexander, Jonathan D. Jones & Peter J. Nigro, Mutual Fund Shareholders:
Characteristics, Investment Knowledge, and Sources of Information, 7 FIN. SERV. REV. 301, 309
(1998) (joint study of fund shareholders conducted by the Office of the Comptroller of the
Currency and the SEC), summarized in Freeman & Brown, supra note 52, at 665.
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investors lack a good understanding of the historical returns of their
fund investments.148
Investors are often unaware that higher fund expenses are a drag on
fund performance. In one survey, about 20% of surveyed investors
believed that high-fee funds produced better results; more than 60%
believed funds with higher expenses produced average results; and
fewer than 16% believed higher expenses led to lower than average
returns.149 In another survey, 84% of respondents believed that higher
fund expenses correlate with higher fund performance.150
Fund investors are relatively insensitive to advisory fees, paying some
attention when they buy, but not as they hold. Funds that reduce their
fees gain market share, but only if their fees were above average to
start. Low-cost funds do not lose market share by charging higher
fees.151
Fund investors have become more sensitive to front-end loads and
commissions, but remain insensitive to operating expenses. Over the
last 30 years, front-end loads (as well as commissions charged by
brokerage firms) have had a consistently negative relation to fund
flows.152 There is no relation (or even a perverse positive relation)
between operating expenses and fund flows. Investors purchase “funds
that attract their attention through advertising and distribution. . . . mutual fund advertising works.”153
In relatively homogenous fund sectors, such as S&P index funds,
investors find it difficult to identify bargains. Investors tend to go with
recognized “name brands” based on fund age and family size, with a
marked shift in sector assets to more expensive (often new entry)
funds.154

148. See generally Dan A. Moore, Terri R. Kurtzberg, Craig R. Fox & Max H. Bazerman,
Positive Illusions and Forecasting Errors in Mutual Fund Investment Decisions, 79 ORG. BEHAV.
& HUMAN DEC. PROCESSES 95 (1999).
149. See Alexander, Jones & Nigro, supra note 147, at 310.
150. See Neil Weinberg, Fund Managers Know Best: As Corporations are Fessing Up to
Investors, Mutual Funds Still Gloss Over Costs, Hide Top-Dog Pay and Keep Secret How They
Cope When Self-Interest Conflicts With Duty, FORBES, Oct. 14, 2002, at 220.
151. Khorana & Servaes, supra note 121, at 3–4.
152. Brad M. Barber, Terrance Odean & Zheng Lu, Out of Sight, Out of Mind: The Effects of
Expenses on Mutual Fund Flows, 78 J. BUS. 2095, 2097 (2005).
153. Id. at 2099.
154. Ali Hortacsu & Chad Syverson, Product Differentiation, Search Costs, and Competition in
the Mutual Fund Industry: A Case Study of S&P 500 Index Funds, 119 QUARTERLY J. ECON. 403
(2004). Fund investors also have difficulty identifying the advantage of index investing. See
Moore, Kurtzberg, Fox & Bazerman, supra note 148, at 96 (hypothesizing that common traits of
over-optimism and framing of choices against past performance contribute significantly to
investors eschewing index funds, which over time outperform actively-managed funds).
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Investor response to market changes
• Fund investors over-trade. In turn, investor short-termism drives the
short investment horizons of fund managers, not the other way
around.155
• Fund investors systematically engage in a “buy high, sell low” trading
strategy. Monthly data from 1984-2003 show a negative relationship
between aggregate net flows into and out of the funds and the returns of
the funds in subsequent periods.156 As a result, fund investors realize
lower long-term accumulated return than the “long-term accumulated
return on a ‘buy and hold’ position in these funds.”157
• Fund investors over-react to market volatility—the “grass is greener”
phenomenon. Stock fund investors withdraw assets in response to
market volatility—both concurrently and based on past semi-annual and
annual volatility.158 Fund investors over-react both to downside
volatility and upside volatility. Stock fund flows, in turn, contribute to
market volatility—as “noisy traders” destabilize the overall stock
market.159
• Fund investors follow the crowd. Net aggregate equity fund flows
typically track general investor sentiment. Moreover, there is a selfreinforcing aspect to investor sentiment as higher equity fund flows
induce newsletter writers to become more bullish.160
Investor response to past performance
• Fund investors respond to the heuristic “past is prologue.”161 Past
performance is at best a weak predictor for anticipating fund
performance. While one-star and two-star Morningstar ratings generally
predict relatively poor future performance, Morningstar’s five-star

155. Li Jin, How Does Investor Short-termism Affect Mutual Fund Manager Short-termism 2
(Unpublished Working Paper, 2005), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=675262.
156. Oded Braverman, Shmuel Kandel & Avi Wohl, The (Bad?) Timing of Mutual Fund
Investors 5 (Unpublished Working Paper, 2005), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=795146.
157. Id.
158. Dengpan Luo, Market Volatility and Mutual Fund Cash Flows 3–4 (Yale ICF Working
Paper No. 03-21, 2003), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=418360. In the period from 1984–
1998, the paper found different results for bond fund investors, who did not respond to past stock
market volatility at the aggregate level. See id. at 7–8.
159. Id. at 8.
160. Daniel C. Indro, Does Mutual Fund Flow Reflect Investor Sentiment?, 5 J. BEHAV. FIN.
105, 112 (2004) (using weekly flow data and sentiment indicators from the American Association
of Individual Investors and Investors Intelligence).
161. The heuristic, valuable in other consumer activities, reflects the likelihood that fund
performance (like that of any randomly constructed stock portfolio) regresses to the mean. This is
not true for other consumer goods. For example, a five-star automobile safety crash rating (based
on the performance of a sample car in a controlled crash test) is a useful predictor that other cars
of the same model and year will perform well in real-life crashes. See Consumer Reports, Annual
Auto Issue: Safety Feature Comparison 35–38 (Apr. 2006), http://www.consumerreports.org/
cro/index.htm.
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funds generally do not outperform four-star and three-star funds.162 In
fact, a 5-star Morningstar rating may be a “kiss of death.”163 Three
years after a fund receives its initial 5-star rating, fund performance
severely falls off across different performance measures and different
samples of funds.164
Fund directors, contrary to anecdotal evidence, often hold shares in the
funds they oversee.165 But there is evidence that directors chase performance in their ownership choices, just like other fund investors.166
The “past is prologue” mentality extends to the financial press. Fund
rankings by the leading financial publications (Barron’s, Business
Week, and Forbes) based on past performance do not predict superior
future performance.167 Most ranked funds (65%) have lower performance in the post-ranking period compared to the pre-ranking period.168

Investor response to scandals
• Response by fund investors to mutual fund scandals has been mixed.
Funds affected by scandals experience significantly greater outflow of
assets, with the outflow greater the more severe the scandal (as
measured by size of regulatory settlement/fine, press coverage, and
filing of formal charges). Outflows are greater where the scandal
involved a penalized entity, as opposed to individual wrongdoers no
longer associated with the fund. But fund scandals first discovered by
the SEC do not result in significant outflows. Lastly, strengthened

162. Christopher R. Blake & Matthew R. Morey, Morningstar Ratings and Mutual Fund
Performance 20–21 (Unpublished Working Paper, 1999), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=
168668 (using data set free of survivorship bias and adjusted for load fees). Most studies confirm
this result. See, e.g., Andrea Frazzini & Owen A. Lamont, Dumb Money: Mutual Fund Flows and
the Cross-Section of Stock Returns (NBER Working Paper No. W11526, 2005), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=776014 (concluding that fund flows are “dumb money” as heavy fund
demand predicts low future returns at long horizons). But some studies come to contrary results.
See, e.g., Russ R. Wermers, Is Money Really ‘Smart’? New Evidence on the Relation Between
Mutual Fund Flows, Manager Behavior, and Performance Persistence 3 (Unpublished Working
Paper, 2003), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=414420 (finding that when consumers invest
heavily in last year’s winning funds, managers of these winners invest these inflows in momentum
stocks to continue to outperform other funds for at least two years following the ranking year).
163. Morey, supra note 135, at 41.
164. Id. at 49–50.
165. Qi Chen, Itay Goldestein & Wei Jiang, Directors’ Ownership in the U.S. Mutual Fund
Industry 2 (Unpublished Working Paper, 2006), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=713462.
166. Id. at 38.
167. Miranda L. Detzler, The Value of Mutual Fund Rankings to the Individual Investor 4
(Unpublished Working Paper, 1999), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=170851 (looking at 757
funds that were ranked between 1993–1995; finding that ranked funds had higher excess returns
compared to peer funds during the pre-ranking period, but similar excess returns in the postranking period; finding also that ranked funds had higher risk, measured by standard deviations, in
both the pre- and post-ranking periods).
168. See Miranda L. Detzler, The Value of Mutual Fund Rankings to the Individual Investor, 8
J. BUS. & ECON. STUD. 48, 50 (2002).
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corporate governance controls have no impact on the amount of
outflows from a scandal fund.169
C. EVALUATION OF DATA
The data paint a dismal picture of fund board performance. Fund boards
have failed in their function to negotiate management fees. In fact, the
recent slowing growth of weighted average fees (compared to the
continuing growth in unweighted average fees) highlights the inability of
fund boards to lower fees, even as some fund investors have moved to
lower-cost funds. That is, fund boards have been less effective in lowering
fund fees than fund investors. Even worse than their performance on
negotiating management fees, fund boards have achieved nothing for their
investors by approving loads—especially 12b-1 fees.
The data tell an equally sad story about fund investors. Fund investors
are often ignorant of fund expenses and unaware of their relation to
performance. They suffer from cognitive biases, for example that “past is
prologue”—a belief they share with the financial press and even fund
managers. Fund design and marketing pander to this belief and overemphasize high Morningstar ratings, which studies show represent a
statistical guarantee the fund will regress to the mean. Many fund investors
shun index funds, even though they are a proven long-term investment
vehicle. Instead, they engage in pathological “buy high, sell low” trading
strategies that over-optimistically aim to out-perform the market. Fund
managers mirror (or induce) a “grass is greener” bias in their over-trading
of portfolio assets and widespread belief that they too can beat the market.
Not everyone can be above average.
Even those studies that suggest independent directors provide some
value—that is, that fund performance and the likelihood of replacing underperforming fund managers increases as the proportion of independent
directors rises—do not establish a causal relationship between board
independence and fund results. Instead, it seems more likely that investorfriendly management firms (i.e., those that adopt strategies of low fees,
long-term investment policies, responsiveness to failed investment
strategies, and investor-appropriate marketing) are more likely to have truly
independent directors advising on these matters. In fact, the studies that
suggest funds with independent chairs out-perform their managementchaired counterparts lead only to the conclusion that management firms
focused on their own profits under-perform firms with an investor focus.170
169. Stephen J. Choi & Marcel Kahan, The Market Penalty for Mutual Fund Scandals 9, 24–26
(NYU, Law and Economics Research Paper No. 06-07, 2006), available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=877896 (reviewing mutual fund scandals from 1994–2004).
170. In fact, the SEC has been unable to point to any evidence that greater board independence
has been effective under the SEC’s exemptive rules. Bullard, Comments on Corporate
Governance, supra note 47, at 1106. Indeed, there is “no evidence that the Commission knows
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III. OPTIONS FOR REFORM
Can the fund board be rehabilitated? The mutual fund industry has
strong reasons to resist having the board structure dismantled. Outsourcing
of regulatory supervision to an internal monitor gives the industry great
freedom—particularly when compared to the alternative of external
regulation.171 In areas of fund management subject to board oversight,
management firms have the discretion to test the limits of the market.
Not surprisingly, there is no impetus for fundamental reform. The
mutual fund industry is quite pleased with the fund board and the results it
has produced. Fund directors, without questioning their own value, have
supported calls for greater independence and greater role clarity. The SEC
willingly parrots the mantra that the fund board is an essential component
of fund regulation, particularly since the job falls outside the agency.
Perhaps the only mutual fund constituents that might have reservations
about the fund board—fund investors—are mostly unaware that there is a
fund board or that it has failed them.
After surveying the data on the higher investment advisory fees charged
mutual funds compared to pension plans, Professors Freeman and Brown
concluded:
The fund industry is over-regulated and under-policed. The absence of a
strong corrective influence should not be surprising. Those in control of an
industry boasting over $7 trillion in liquid assets can afford superb
lawyers, lobbyists, and public relations specialists. . . . Congress has not
shown interest in improving investors’ remedies and cannot be counted on
to alter the way the fund industry chooses to conduct itself. The SEC
generally has contented itself with presenting proposals destined to have
little impact on the way most mutual funds do business.172

To the extent that some mutual funds have shown a “reform
mentality”—lowering management fees, offering life-cycle funds intended
to encourage proven long-term investment strategies, and cautioning
investors against over-trading—the new attitudes seem driven more by
greater investor sophistication than by awakened fund boards. The industry
recognizes the scandal-induced skepticism about its product and has every
reason to show that its house is in order and that the current regulatory
structure is adequate.
But given the long-standing failure of the fund board and the continuing
inability of investors to discipline industry excess, the time is ripe for a
fundamental re-appraisal of the fund board.
whether the independent directors have been effective in the context of the operation of the
exemptive rules . . . ,” and there is “no evidence that the Commission knows if the exemptive rules
themselves have been effective in protecting investors.” Id. at 1096.
171. Wang, supra note 3, at 958–59.
172. Freeman & Brown, supra note 52, at 641–42 (citations omitted).
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A. ALTERNATIVES TO BOARD-CENTRIC STRUCTURES
The recent mutual fund scandals and a slowing stock market have led
many to question the efficacy of the fund board. Reform proposals, most of
which seek to create additional structures to compensate for the board’s
failure, have become a cottage industry.
Consider some recent proposals:
New SRO. Some reformers have proposed a new self-regulatory organization to oversee mutual funds, thus augmenting fund boards and taking
pressure off limited SEC resources. Rather than the current reliance on
internal mechanisms, the SRO could engage in more focused rule making,
with the SEC (and state attorneys general) using their enforcement powers
as a “residual mechanism.”173
New oversight board. Others have suggested a Mutual Fund Oversight
Board, modeled on the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board,
which would be responsible for (and only for) establishing uniform
minimum standards for fund governance. The new board would perform an
investigative and rule-making function, providing the flexibility that the
SEC lacks to keep standards current.174
New “expert” directors. Others would seek to make the fund board
more independent and qualified by mandating that the board include a
certified financial analyst (CFA)175—much like the Sarbanes-Oxley
requirement of a financial expert on the audit committee of public
companies.176 The CFA would presumably be better able to recognize
excessive fund fees.177
Invigorate mutual fund litigation. Others would call on courts to
make derivative litigation a “serviceable mechanism for serious judicial
review in cases of fiduciary breach.”178 Given the deficiencies of investor
market oversight, courts should look at the merits of fund over-pricing.
173. Joel Seligman, Should Investment Companies Be Subject to a New Statutory SelfRegulatory Organization?, 83 WASH. U. L.Q. 1115, 1126 (2005) (arguing for consideration of
self-regulatory organization to oversee mutual funds).
174. Review of Mutual Fund Industry Investigations: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Banking,
Housing, and Urban Affairs, 108th Cong. 2 (2004) (statement of Mercer Bullard, President and
Founder, Fund Democracy, Inc.). See generally Patrick McGeehan, With Critics at the Door,
Funds Propose Cleaning Own House, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 31, 2003, at C1 (discussing critics’ view
of the current system and the need for reform). See Mutual Fund Investor Protection Act of 2003,
S. 1958, 108th Cong. § 201 (2003) (Senator John Kerry proposed a bill which would have created
a Mutual Oversight Board).
175. Tobe, supra note 19, at 28 (suggesting CFA, a designation awarded by the Association for
Investment Management and Research; also pointing to studies showing that public pension plans
with CFA officers have lower fees).
176. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 407, 15 U.S.C. § 7265 (Supp. II 2002).
177. Tobe, supra note 19, at 28.
178. Langevoort, supra note 28, at 1043.
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More investor-usable disclosure. Others have urged the SEC to
mandate greater disclosure of fund expenses—as is required in other
financial service industries and consumer markets. Some would require
individualized disclosure in account statements that show actual fund
expenses, with a break down of fees and other expenses.179 Some would
require that the statements also include how the actual expenses compared
with industry ranges and averages.180
But others—mostly practicing lawyers—doubt whether the board can
be salvaged. Some assert that the SEC’s initiatives to buttress board
independence are of “questionable efficacy” and implicitly conclude that
the board cannot fulfill its watchdog function.181 A few have called for the
fund board to be eliminated, describing it as “paraphernalia.”182 As one
reform proponent pointed out a fund without directors would not make “an
awful lot of difference and would be cheaper to operate.”183
Even the SEC has imagined mutual funds without directors. In a 1992
study the SEC staff considered a board-less fund structure, called a unitary
investment fund (UIF), as part a comprehensive review of existing fund
governance.184 The concept was a mutual fund that would be treated as a
proprietary financial product sold by a sponsor and governed by the terms
of a trust indenture. As proposed, the UIF would have a corporate trustee
(the sponsor/management firm) that would sell interests in the trust to
investors. The trust indenture would spell out fundamental investment
policies and the management fee, and could be changed only with some
difficulty. A single management fee would cover all fund-related expenses
and would be subject to a statutory maximum. The UIF would have no
board of directors or shareholder voting, nor would there be judicial review

179. See U.S. Gen. Accounting Office, Mutual Fund Fees Additional Disclosure Could
Encourage Price Competition 97–98 (2000), http://www.gao.gov/archive/2000/gg00126.pdf
(proposing disclosure of total dollar amount of expenses in quarterly statements); Freeman &
Brown, supra note 52, at 669–670 (proposing that mutual funds be required to itemize their
different fund expenses, such as: advisory fees, operating costs, and trading costs).
180. See Cox & Payne, supra note 62, at 929. The proposal is similar to one considered by the
SEC staff in 1992. See SEC Staff Report Protecting Investors, supra note 25, at 337 (outlining
Unified Fee Investment Company (UFIC), which would have a simplified fee computed as a
percentage of fund assets, permitting ready comparison to other similar funds; the fee would cover
all fund expenses other than extraordinary expenses and brokerage commissions on the fund’s
own transactions).
181. Martin Lybecker, Enhanced Governance for Mutual Funds: A Flawed Concept that
Deserves Serious Reconsideration, 83 WASH. U. L.Q. 1045, 1085–87 (2005).
182. Phillips, supra note 23, at 903.
183. Karen Damato, David Reilly & Karen Richardson, Do Mutual Funds Really Need
Directors?, WALL ST. J., June 7, 2004, at R1 (reporting comments of Sheldon Jacobs, editor of the
No-Load Investor newsletter).
184. SEC Staff Report Protecting Investors, supra note 25, at 283–84. The idea of a UIF, which
was first floated by Stephen West of Sullivan & Cromwell, led to the SEC requesting public
comment on the UIF in 1982. Advance Notice and Request for Comment on Mutual Fund
Governance, 47 Fed. Reg. 56,509 (Dec. 10, 1982).
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of fund fees. The 1940 Act prohibitions against self-dealing transactions
would apply, without exception.185
Ultimately, the staff rejected the UIF concept as not offering an
adequate substitute for board review of fees and other fund operations. The
SEC staff seemed unwilling to imagine a model without an independent
monitor. Instead, the staff concluded that the board-centric governance
structure is fundamentally “sound” and should be retained.186
But the idea of a board-less mutual fund is not far-fetched. In fact, the
fastest-growing mutual funds in the United States—private hedge funds and
some exchange traded funds organized as unit trusts—do not have board
structures.187 Like registered mutual funds, these financial intermediaries
pool money that investors entrust to professional managers to make
investments on their behalf. Fee setting is a matter of contract, and
regulatory compliance is an internal responsibility of the management firm.
Even though hedge funds are subject to nearly identical internal
conflicts as registered mutual funds, the idea of a fund board to ensure
hedge fund compliance and to regulate management activities were not
even considered in the recent SEC rule-making to require hedge fund
registration.188 Instead, the SEC rules (which were recently invalidated)
would have required that hedge funds registered with the SEC have a
compliance officer.189 The compliance officer, unlike the mutual fund
board, would have no authority to validate self-interested activities of the
fund manager. The compliance officer—whose functions were to parallel
those performed by in-house legal departments and compliance offices in
brokerage firms, banks and insurance companies—would have simply been
charged with establishing control systems to ensure legal compliance.
The SEC explained the compliance officer’s function in much the same
terms as it has described the mutual fund board:
Hedge fund advisers . . . must develop and implement a compliance
infrastructure. . . . Our examination staff resources are limited, and we
185. See Wang, supra note 3, at 1024–25 (summarizing UIF proposal).
186. See SEC Staff Report Protecting Investors, supra note 25, at 283.
187. Insurance separate accounts are also exempt from the board requirements. The
performance of equity funds managed by insurance companies gives reason to pause. In a recent
study, insurance funds under perform non-insurance peers by more than 1% in average annual
returns. Perhaps, as speculated by the authors of the study, this is due to insurance industry
conservatism or lack of investor-driven incentives to pursue superior performance. Or perhaps, a
possibility not mentioned by the authors, the weak performance is due to the absence of a fund
board. See Xuanjuan Chen, Tong Yao & Tong Yu, Prudent Man or Agency Problem? On the
Performance of Insurance Mutual Funds 1–3 (August 28, 2004), available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=589801.
188. Registration Under the Advisers Act of Certain Hedge Fund Advisers, 69 Fed. Reg. 72,054
(Dec. 10, 2004) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 275 and 279), invalidated by Goldstein v. SEC,
451 F.3d 873 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
189. See Investment Advisors Act of 1940, 17 C.F.R. § 275.206(4)-7 (2006), invalidated by
Goldstein v. SEC, 451 F.3d at 874.

2006]

The Mutual Fund Board

205

cannot be at the office of every adviser at all times. Compliance officers
serve as the front line watch for violations of securities laws, and provide
protection against conflicts of interests.190

For hedge funds, external regulatory oversight ultimately resides with
the SEC under its powers to regulate securities fraud and the fiduciary
responsibilities of investment advisers under federal and state law, as well
as with investors through contractual protections and their ability to “enter”
and “exit” the fund.
B. MUTUAL FUND STRUCTURES OUTSIDE OF THE UNITED STATES
Mutual fund boards are largely a U.S. phenomenon. Most other
countries treat mutual funds as an investment “product” offered by
investment management firms. The regulatory focus elsewhere is on the
management firm, not the investment pool or its legal supervisor.
Regulation of product terms (fees and management services), custodial
responsibilities, and fund marketing is a matter of government agency
supervision, with residual oversight by self-regulatory organizations and
courts under a regime of fiduciary duties that fall on the management firm.
Consider the regulation of mutual funds in Germany, Japan and Britain.
In Germany mutual funds are not separate entities, but instead segregated
asset pools managed by an investment management firm that is regulated by
the German Federal Banking Commission (BAKred).191 Investors enter into
a contract with the management firm and acquire participatory units in the
segregated assets, with the management firm obligated to repurchase the
units if redeemed by the investor. The assets must be kept with a custodian
bank, which is obligated to supervise the management firm on behalf of
fund investors. Thus, protection of fund investors in Germany is primarily
the responsibility of the management firm, which has a statutory duty to act
in the interests of fund investors. The management firm, in turn, is
supervised by the custodian bank and the BAKred, both of which may bring
suit against the management firm for failures to act. The BAKred may
dismiss a fund manager who is unfit professionally or who violates the
mutual fund rules.
In Japan mutual funds exist as investment trusts, with a trustee that
must be a trust company or bank.192 The trustee enters into a “contract of
trust” with an investment trust management company, which must be
licensed and is subject to statutory standards. The management company
gives advice with respect to trust assets and has fiduciary duties in relation

190. See Registration Under the Advisers Act of Certain Hedge Fund Advisers, 69 Fed. Reg. at
72,063.
191. Wang, supra note 3, at 951. The BAKred, among other things, specifies the qualifications
for the mandatory managing directors of the management firm. Id. at 951–52.
192. Id. at 953–55.
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to the assets, though not necessarily to fund investors. The trustee keeps
custody and administers the trust assets. Fund investors have beneficial
interests in the trust. The Ministry of Finance regulates the trustee, as well
as the terms of the trust contract entered into with the management
company. The management company is subject to the rules of a selfregulatory group, the Investment Trust Association.
In Britain mutual funds are unit trusts, constituted under trust law.193
The trustee contracts with a manager (a firm or individual) that manages the
trust assets, though the trustee retains custody and control of the assets. The
trustee oversees the manager, though the manager typically appoints the
trustee. To qualify as an authorized unit trust, the trust must comply with
detailed regulations that cover its constitution, the power and duties of the
trustee and manager, investment and borrowing powers, and pricing and
valuation. The trustee and manager are both subject to regulation by selfregulating organizations. Government oversight comes from the
Department of Trade and Industry, which has delegated most of its powers
to the non-governmental Securities and Investment Board.
In addition, since 1997 mutual funds in the United Kingdom can be
operated as open-ended investment companies (OEICs), which can be
marketed elsewhere in the European Union.194 An OEIC is established
under company law rather than trust law. The OEIC owns the underlying
assets and investors own shares that reflect their interests in those assets.
The OEIC must have a board, though the only board member required is the
authorized fund manager. Although independent directors are permitted, in
practice nearly all OEIC boards are comprised of the manager alone. In
addition, there must be a depository who has the same responsibilities for
custody and oversight that the trustee has in the unit trust.
OEICs were designed to replicate the characteristics of unit trusts but
with a corporate structure. For all practical purposes, the two are identical
from the investor’s standpoint. The OEIC provides a vehicle recognized in
continental Europe; there were no other advantages seen to the corporate
form. In both the OEIC and unit trust, the authorized fund manager makes
the day-to-day investment decisions of the fund, prices portfolio assets, and
maintains financial records. The role of the trustee and the depository are
essentially identical, to safeguard portfolio assets, oversee the manager’s
activities, and ensure compliance with FSA rules. FSA regulation is the
cornerstone of investor protection in the United Kingdom.

193. Id. at 955–56.
194. American Enterprise Institute, The Regulation and Structure of Collective Investment
Vehicles Outside the United States (May 2006), http://www.aei.org/events/filter.all,eventID.1318/
summary.asp# (summary of a presentation by Richard Saunders, Chief Executive of U.K.
Investment Management Association).
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Investors in each country have, at best, a minimal role in fund
governance. In Germany and Japan, investors have no voting rights.195 In
the United Kingdom, investors of unit trusts can vote on only four matters:
changing the trust deed, approving departures from stated investment
policy, removing the manager, and approving trust mergers.196
The “product” structure, compared to the “board” structure, of mutual
fund regulation makes clear that investors are purchasing services from an
investment management firm. The buck stops with the government
regulator, who has collateral support from courts that enforce the fiduciary
duties of the management firm and (in some countries) from self-regulatory
organizations that set standards of professional conduct.
IV. CONCLUSION
At the time of the 1940 Act, it was inconceivable that the fund board
would oversee fund families with hundreds of different funds, spanning the
full range of modern investment styles, some with over $1 trillion in assets
under management. Equally unimaginable was the reality that mutual funds
would become the primary investment vehicle for private retirement
savings—surpassing company pension plans, bank accounts, and brokerage
investments. And still more far-fetched was the likelihood, or so it seems,
that mutual funds would supplant or even absorb the federal social security
system as the funding vehicle for retirement income.
Regulatory outsourcing was an innovation of the 1940 Act—in marked
contrast to the multi-faceted regulatory approach applied to public offerings
under the 1933 Act and the nod to self-regulation of securities firms and
stock exchanges under the 1934 Act. Rather than external supervision by
the SEC or a self-regulatory organization (none existed), Congress
delegated supervision to an internal regulator.
At best, the mutual fund board is an anachronism, a throw back to the
time that the mutual fund was seen as an investment holding company (on
the model of Berkshire-Hathaway) and the fund board a servant of investor
interests. But the board suffers from fundamental structural flaws.
Independent directors are neither independent of the management firm nor
truly capable of being directors. They are selected by the management firm,
rely on it for information and direction, and are paid (sometimes
handsomely) not according to the results for fund investors, but based on
currying continuing favor with the firm they are supposed to supervise.
They are effectively limited in their power to fire the management firm, to
revamp the business or sell it to outside buyers, or to enter into tough
negotiations on behalf of fund investors.

195. Wang, supra note 3, at 962.
196. Id.
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The evidence bears out the fund board’s inherent weakness and leads to
the unavoidable conclusion that internal regulation cannot but fail. In a
market that lacks effective arbitrage mechanisms to bring fund expenses
into line, the board has no effective means to truly regulate management
fees and ensure that fund marketing is in the interests of fund investors. Not
surprisingly, as the mutual fund industry has exploded in size, and during a
period of unparalleled advances in computer and telecommunications
technology, the economies of scale and operational efficiencies have
redounded to the benefit of management firms, not fund investors.
Likewise, fund boards have approved loads and marketing fees that increase
market share, thus boosting fees for the management firm, but without any
benefit for fund investors. Rather than focusing fund marketing on investor
education, the fund board has permitted advertising that exploits the
informational defects and cognitive foibles of fund investors.
It is remarkable that in an industry widely described as heavily
regulated, the board-centric structure faces so little accountability. Each of
the potential sources of board monitoring—the SEC, federal courts, state
courts—has adopted the attitude that somebody is doing the job. The SEC
ultimately assumes that fund investors acting in markets will discipline
wayward boards; the federal courts defer to the investor market and the
regulatory function of the SEC; and state courts apply the business
judgment rule, which assumes that markets are more discerning than
judges.
At worst the fund board creates an illusion of investor protection. It
allows the industry to tell the appealing story (however false) that the board
serves as a “watchdog” against internal malfeasance, while fund investors
exercise their powerful “entry/exit” rights to discipline management firm
over-charging, over-trading, and over-marketing. The very existence of an
internal monitor may actually be counter-productive. Rather than
constraining management excesses, the presence of the supposedly independent board may actually embolden management firms to disregard their
responsibility to fund investors, on the glib belief that the board performs its
functions. Behavioral studies show that fiduciaries led to believe that
someone else is protecting the interests of their beneficiaries tend to
minimize and slacken their own fiduciary performance.197 A lackadaisical
watchdog may be worse than no watchdog at all.
Look again there.

197. Daylian M. Cain, George Loewenstein & Don A. Moore, The Dirt on Coming Clean: The
Perverse Effects of Disclosing Conflicts of Interest, 34 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 9 (2005) (finding that
when subjects asked to guess the amount of money in a jar, with the help of an “adviser” who had
disclosed conflicting interests, the subjects were more likely to trust the adviser on the theory
disclosure evidences good faith, and the adviser feels greater moral freedom to act selfishly on the
theory the subject has been put on notice).

